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ABSTRACT
The paper provides an overview of the hedge
fund industry, mainly from a financial stability
and European angle. It is primarily based on an
extensive analysis of information from the
TASS database. On the positive side of the
financial stability assessment, hedge funds
have a role as providers of diversification and
liquidity, and they contribute to the integration
and completeness of financial markets.
Possible negative effects occur through their
impact on financial markets (e.g. via crowded
trades) and financial institutions (e.g. via
prime brokerage). Several initiatives have been
launched to address these concerns and most of
them follow indirect regulation via banks. If
any direct regulation were to be considered, it
would probably have to be implemented in a
coordinated manner at the international level.
At the EU level there is currently no common
regulatory regime, although some Member
States have adopted national legislation.
Key words: asset management, crowded trades,
financial regulation, financial stability, hedge
funds, prime brokerage, risk management.
JEL classification: G15, G18, G21, G23, G245
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This paper provides an overview of the hedge
fund industry, mainly from a financial stability
angle and with an emphasis on its European
Union (EU) dimension. Hedge funds still
represent a relatively small share of the asset
management industry. Nevertheless they have
been growing impressively, with total capital
under management now estimated to be over
USD 1 trillion globally. Their active role in
financial markets means that they are much
more important than suggested by their size
alone. These developments have ensured that
hedge funds have the continued attention of
public authorities and the financial community,
the more so since there remains a large degree
of uncertainty regarding the implications for
financial stability.
Although there is no common definition of what
constitutes a hedge fund, it can be described as
an unregulated or loosely regulated fund which
can freely use various active investment
strategies to achieve positive absolute returns.
Typically, the fees of fund managers are related
to the performance of the fund in question and
managers often commit their own money.
Although the investment strategy, by definition,
varies widely, hedge funds can be broadly
classified as directional, market neutral or event
driven funds. Although they typically target
high net worth individuals and institutional
investors, their products have recently become
increasingly available to retail investors due to
the development of funds investing in hedge
funds and structured financial instruments with
hedge fund-linked performance. A multitude of
parties are involved in the operation of such
funds: managers, administrators, custodian
banks, prime brokers, investors, etc. Some of
these roles are also being assumed by banks, and
more banks are seen to be setting up their own
hedge funds.
Hedge funds are primarily domiciled in
offshore centres because of the ensuing light
regulatory treatment and favourable tax
regimes. Most hedge funds are relatively small,
with capital under management of less than
USD 100 million, although this varies
according to the investment strategy applied.
EU hedge funds, i.e. funds domiciled in the EU
and/or with managers residing in the EU, are
mainly established in Luxembourg and Ireland
and their managers are generally based in
London. The market share of EU hedge funds
have continued to expand, mainly at the
expense of funds managed from the United
States.
It is challenging to make an unambiguous
assessment of the impact of hedge funds on
financial stability, not least because of the lack
of complete information on their activity,
financial structure and interaction with banks.
As active market participants they often take
contrarian positions, thus contributing to market
liquidity, dampening market volatility and
acting as a counterbalance to market herding. In
addition, they offer diversification possibilities
and allow new risk-return combinations to be
achieved, leading to more complete financial
markets. It can also be argued that by
eliminating market inefficiencies hedge funds
have probably contributed to the integration of
financial markets.
The near-collapse of LTCM in 1998 highlights
how hedge fund activities can also seriously
harm financial stability. Such negative effects
basically occur through their impact on
financial markets and financial institutions, in
particular via banks that act as prime brokers or
that take similar market positions as hedge
funds. The management of banks’ exposures
to hedge funds is complex and requires
continuous improvements and vigilance to
keep up with developments. As the number of
hedge funds attempting to exploit the same
market opportunities increases, there are also
concerns that this same positioning may
seriously affect certain markets in the event
of simultaneous selling. It is particularly
challenging to assess how hedge funds affect
and are being affected by the interaction of
market risk, liquidity risk, credit risk and
leverage.6
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Since the near-default of LTCM, several public
and private initiatives have been launched to
address some of the concerns related to hedge
funds. Most of these initiatives recognise that it
is very difficult to regulate hedge funds directly
given the ease with which they can change their
domicile and avoid regulation. These initiatives
therefore focus on indirect regulation which
targets the counterparties of hedge funds, in
particular banks. Such indirect regulation aims
at enhancing risk management practices in
banks and improving disclosure by hedge funds.
If any direct regulation were to be considered, it
would probably have to be implemented in a
strongly coordinated manner at the international
(transatlantic) level. Finally, as hedge funds
become increasingly available to retail
investors, though generally in an indirect way,
there might also be a need to address investor
protection concerns. At present there is no
common regulatory regime for hedge funds in
the EU, although a number of Member States
have adopted national legislation.
1 INTRODUCTION
Hedge funds first came to prominence with
the near-collapse of Long-Term Capital
Management (LTCM) in September 1998.
Recently, they have again started to attract the
attention of the global financial community –
this time for their impressive growth and
increasing proliferation as a mainstream
alternative investment vehicle. Although the
hedge fund industry is still relatively modest in
size, the pace of growth indicates that hedge
funds are heading towards becoming important
non-bank financial intermediaries. However,
while the role of other major institutional
investors is well established, analysed and
understood, the same is not true with regard to
hedge funds, their activities, their impact on
financial markets, and their implications for
financial stability, all of which remain
relatively less explored.
The purpose of this paper is to provide an
overview of the hedge fund industry from a
financial stability perspective, with some
emphasis on the European Union (EU)
dimension. The paper starts in Section 2 by
providing a working definition of a hedge fund
and by examining some of the key features of
hedge funds. Hedge funds differ from each
other in many respects, but their most notable
distinguishing feature is the investment
strategy they pursue. Section 3 accordingly
provides a classification of such strategies.
Section 4 reviews the basic characteristics of
the hedge fund industry, and includes a
synopsis of the different institutional
relationships involved in hedge fund
operations. Quantitative estimates of the recent
expansion in hedge funds are provided in
Section 5, along with a number of factors that
could explain this evolution. Section 6 assesses
the impact of hedge funds on financial
stability. Section 7 addresses the supervisory
concerns related to hedge fund activity and
the various initiatives taken so far to address
these concerns. Finally, Section 8 concludes by
summarising the main issues and provides an
outlook for the future.
2 THE CONCEPT OF HEDGE FUNDS
Strictly speaking, the term “hedge fund” is not
a correct definition of the institutions under
consideration. The term has historical
significance, as in the beginning of the second
half of the last century the first institutions of
this kind were engaged in buying and short-
selling equities with the aim of eliminating
(hedging) the risk of market-wide fluctuations.
However, the possibility of using short-selling
and other types of hedging is not unique to
hedge funds. Moreover, over time hedge funds
have started to use a wide variety of other
investment strategies that do not necessarily
involve hedging.
There is no legal or even generally accepted
definition of a hedge fund, although the
US President’s Working Group on Financial
Markets (1999) characterised such entities
as “any pooled investment vehicle that7
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is privately organised, administered by
professional investment managers, and not
widely available to the public”.1 While this
definition distinguishes hedge funds from
public investment companies, it does not
capture many of the distinctive features of
hedge funds and is so broad that it includes
many other alternative investment vehicles,
such as venture capital firms, private equity
funds, real estate funds and commodity pools.
In contrast to other pooled investment vehicles,
hedge funds make extensive use of short-
selling, leverage2 and derivatives.
Nevertheless, it would be inaccurate to assign
these attributes exclusively to hedge funds, as
other financial companies, including banks and
other registered and unregistered investment
companies, also engage in such operations. The
key difference is that hedge funds do not have
any restrictions on the type of instruments or
strategies they can use owing to their
unregulated or lightly regulated nature. A
summary of some key hedge fund
characteristics is presented in Table 1, which
demonstrates that hedge funds represent a
flexible business model and investment
process rather than an alternative asset class.
In addition to single hedge funds, there are
funds of hedge funds (FOHFs), i.e. funds that
invest in a number of other hedge funds. In this
way diversification and selection services are
provided to investors that are not able to
perform adequate due diligence, lack the
required expertise or do not meet high
minimum investment requirements. FOHFs
usually charge less than single hedge funds3 and
often offer monthly or quarterly redemption to
1 For more definitions, see Vaughan (2003) (www.sec.gov/
spotlight/hedgefunds/hedge-vaughn.htm).
2 In this paper, the term “leverage” refers to both economic
(debt) and financial (instrument) leverage. The former is
associated with increased assets under management, whereas
the latter refers to making investments on margin, where the
cost of investment is less than the exposure it generates (e.g.
through financial derivatives).
3 Performance and management fees range between 5-15% and
0.5-1.5% respectively. However, because of their structure,
they do involve different levels of costs, so that the final cost
for the investor can end up being high.
Return objective Positive absolute returns under all market conditions, without regard to a particular benchmark.
Usually managers also commit their own money; therefore, the preservation of capital is very
important.
Investment strategies Position-taking in a wide range of markets.Free to choose various investment techniques,
including short-selling, leverage and derivatives.
Incentive structure Typically 1-2% management fee and 15-25% performance fee.
Quite often high watermarks apply (i.e. performance fees are paid only if cumulative performance
recovers any past shortfalls) and/or a certain hurdle rate must be exceeded before managers may
receive any incentive allocation.
Subscription/Withdrawal Predefined schedule with quarterly or monthly subscription and redemption.
Lock-up periods for up to one year until first redemption. Some hedge funds retain the right to
suspend redemptions under exceptional circumstances.
Domicile Offshore financial centres with low tax and regulatory regimes, and some other onshore financial
centres.
Legal structure Private investment partnership that provides pass-through tax treatment or offshore investment
corporation. Master-feeder structure may be used for investors with different tax status, where
investors choose appropriate onshore or offshore feeder funds pooled into a master fund.
Managers May or may not be registered or regulated by financial supervisors. Managers serve as general
partners in private partnership agreements.
Investor base High net worth individuals and institutional investors. High minimum investment levels.
Not widely available to the public. Securities issued take the form of private placements.
Regulation Generally minimal or no regulatory oversight due to their offshore residence or “light touch”
approach by onshore regulators; exempt from many investor protection and disclosure
requirements.
Disclosure Voluntary or very limited disclosure requirements in comparison with registered investment funds.
Table 1 Hedge fund characteristics8
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suit institutional and retail investors.
Moreover, for the even more risk-averse
investor, there are also so-called F3 hedge
funds or funds of FOHFs, which represent the
third layer on top of single hedge funds (F1) and
FOHFs (F2). To be commercially viable, F3
funds have to negotiate substantial fee rebates
from underlying FOHFs.
Noting the inaccurate nature of the expression
“hedge fund”, the European Parliament instead
decided to use the term “Sophisticated
Alternative Investment Vehicles” (SAIVs),
which would also encompass other alternative
investment funds that differ from conventional
UCITS (Undertakings for Collective
Investments in Transferable Securities).4 A
variety of similar terms have elsewhere been
used by other institutions. The Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)
opted to employ the term “highly leveraged
institutions” (HLIs), a label covering hedge
funds as well as other institutions that are
subject to very little or no direct regulatory
oversight, have very limited disclosure
requirements, and often take on significant
leverage.5 The Multidisciplinary Working
Group on Enhanced Disclosure (MWGED)
preferred to use the term “leveraged investment
funds”.6 Interestingly, the United Kingdom’s
Financial Services Authority (FSA) declined to
define the term because of the absence of
identifiable commonality; more recently it has
indicated for supervisory monitoring purposes
its preference to focus on the investment
techniques of hedge funds rather than on issues
of legal structure.7
For the purpose of this paper, the market
practice of using the term “hedge fund” will be
followed. This term denotes a fund whose
managers receive performance-related fees and
can freely use various active investment
strategies to achieve positive absolute returns,
involving any combination of leverage,
derivatives, long and short positions in
securities or any other assets in a wide range of
markets. This working definition stresses the
most important features of hedge funds that are
likely to endure, given that all other second-tier
characteristics, including regulation,
registration, investor base and disclosure, will
probably evolve. However, this definition does
not completely separate hedge funds from
private equity or venture capital funds. As a
rule, the latter vehicles do not pursue active
strategies that extensively employ leverage,
short-selling or derivatives, and usually have
much longer lock-up periods.
3 TYPOLOGY OF HEDGE FUNDS
As noted earlier, the first hedge funds were
predominantly engaged in market neutral or
“hedged” trading, trying to insulate their
positions against market-wide gyrations. This
is no longer the case as hedge funds now also
pursue directional strategies. Since hedge
funds do not have any restrictions on the type of
instruments they can use or on how to conduct
operations, they are usually classified by their
investment style. This criterion is more
important for a hedge fund’s risk-return profile
than its asset class selection or sector/
geographic orientation.
To simplify the analysis, it is useful to group
strategies into four major sets: directional,
market neutral, event-driven and FOHFs.
Directional  hedge funds generally try to
anticipate market movements and offer high
returns commensurate with the high risks and
leverage involved. Macro hedge funds are the
most prominent example of this investment
style. Such funds follow a “top-down”
approach, and try to profit from major
economic trends or events. Emerging markets
and other directional hedge funds with a
regional focus, by contrast, favour a “bottom-
up” approach, i.e. they tend to be asset pickers
in certain markets and look for inefficiencies in
developing markets.
4 European Parliament (2003 and 2004).
5 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1999a).
6 Multidisciplinary Working Group on Enhanced Disclosure
(2001).
7 UK’s Financial Supervisory Authority (2002 and 2005b).9
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3 TYPOLOGY OF
HEDGE FUNDS In contrast to directional funds, market neutral
hedge funds (also referred to as arbitrage or
relative value funds) search for arbitrage or
relative value opportunities to exploit various
price discrepancies, and try to avoid exposure
to market-wide movements. Here, the meaning
of arbitrage is somewhat looser and includes
trades that entail some risk of loss or
uncertainty about total profits. Such strategies
are attractive due to their lower volatility, but
they require medium to high leverage in order
to benefit from small pricing distortions,
particularly in fixed income markets.
Event driven strategies lie somewhere in the
middle of the volatility spectrum, with
corresponding medium volatility and low to
medium leverage. Profit opportunities arise
from special occasions in a company’s life,
such as mergers and acquisitions,
reorganisations or bankruptcies. Merger
arbitrage typically involves buying the shares
of a target company and selling the shares of the
acquiring company. Hedge funds investing in
distressed securities try to exploit the fact that
it is difficult to value such securities, and that
many institutional investors are prohibited
from investing in them.
Finally, FOHFs should have lower volatility
and attractive risk-adjusted returns due to
diversification benefits.
The detailed version of the classification used
in the TASS database, on which the analysis
in this paper is to a large extent based, is
provided in Table 2. Other private vendors
might use slightly different categories, but
such differences are unlikely to be very
substantial, as the major strategies are grouped
in a broadly similar way.
Investors can access hedge funds in a number of
ways, and this diversity can serve as an
additional classification criterion. Private
placements of limited participation interests in
private partnerships or offshore investment
fund shares are the most common ways to make
direct capital injections. In some cases (for
example, in Ireland or Luxembourg), shares of
Group Strategy Description
Directional Long/Short Equity Hedge This directional strategy involves equity-oriented investing on both the long and short
sides of the market. The objective is not to be market neutral. Managers have the
ability to shift from value to growth, from small to medium to large capitalisation
stocks, and from a net long position to a net short position. Managers may use futures
and options to hedge. The focus may be regional, such as long/short US or European
equity, or sector-specific, such as long and short technology or healthcare stocks.
Long/short equity funds tend to build and hold portfolios that are substantially more
concentrated than those of traditional stock funds.
Dedicated Short Bias Dedicated short-sellers were once a robust category of hedge funds before the long
bull market of the late 1990s rendered the strategy difficult to implement. A new
category, “short biased”, has since emerged. The strategy is to maintain net short as
opposed to pure short exposure. Short-biased managers take short positions in mostly
equities and derivatives. The short bias of a manager’s portfolio must be constantly
greater than zero to be classified in this category.
Global Macro Global macro managers carry long and short positions in any of the world’s major
capital or derivative markets. These positions reflect their views on overall market
direction as influenced by major economic trends and/or events. The portfolios of
these funds can include stocks, bonds, currencies and commodities in the form of cash
or derivatives instruments. Most funds invest globally in both developed and
emerging markets.
Emerging Markets This strategy involves equity or fixed income investing in emerging markets around
the world. Because many emerging markets do not allow short-selling, nor offer
viable futures or other derivative products with which to hedge, emerging market
investing often employs a long-only strategy.
Table 2 Hedge fund category definitions10
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Table 2 (cont’d)
Directional Managed Futures This strategy invests in listed financial and commodity futures markets and currency
markets around the world. The managers are usually referred to as Commodity
Trading Advisors, or CTAs. Trading disciplines are generally systematic or
discretionary. Systematic traders tend to use price and market-specific information
(often technical) to make trading decisions, while discretionary managers use a
judgemental approach.
Event Driven These strategies are defined as special situations investing, designed to capture price
movements generated by a significant pending corporate event such as a merger,
corporate restructuring, liquidation, bankruptcy or reorganisation.
Risk (Merger) Arbitrage Specialists invest simultaneously long and short in the companies involved in a
merger or acquisition. Risk arbitrageurs are typically long in the stock of the company
being acquired and short in the stock of the acquirer. By shorting the stock of the
acquirer, the manager hedges out market risk, and isolates his/her exposure to the
outcome of the announced deal. The principal risk is deal risk, should the deal fail to
close. Risk arbitrageurs also often invest in equity restructurings such as spin-offs or
“stub trades” that involve the securities of a parent and its subsidiary companies.
Distressed/ Fund managers invest in the debt, equity or trade claims of companies in financial
High Yield Securities distress or already in default. The securities of companies in distressed or defaulted
situations typically trade at substantial discounts to par value due to difficulties in
analysing a proper value for such securities, lack of street coverage, or simply an
inability on behalf of traditional investors to value accurately such claims or direct
their legal interests during restructuring proceedings. Various strategies have been
developed by which investors may take hedged or outright short positions in such
claims, although this asset class is in general a long-only strategy. Managers may also
take arbitrage positions within a company’s capital structure, typically by purchasing
a senior debt tier and short-selling common stock, in the hope of realising returns from
shifts in the spread between the two tiers.
Regulation D, or Reg. D This sub-set refers to investments in micro and small capitalisation public companies
that are raising money in private capital markets. Investments usually take the form of
a convertible security with an exercise price that floats or is subject to a look-back
provision that insulates the investor from a decline in the price of the underlying
stock.
Market Neutral Fixed Income Arbitrage The fixed income arbitrageur aims to profit from price anomalies between related
interest rate securities. Most managers trade globally with a goal of generating steady
returns with low volatility. This category includes interest rate swap arbitrage, US and
non-US government bond arbitrage, forward yield curve arbitrage, and mortgage-
backed securities arbitrage. The mortgage-backed market is primarily US-based,
over-the-counter (OTC) and is particularly complex.
Convertible Arbitrage This strategy is identified by hedged investing in the convertible securities of a
company. A typical investment is long in the convertible bond and short in the
common stock of the same company. Positions are designed to generate profits from
the fixed income security as well as the short sale of stock, while protecting principal
from market moves.
Equity Market Neutral This investment strategy is designed to exploit equity market inefficiencies and
usually involves having simultaneously long and short matched equity portfolios of
the same size within a country. Market neutral portfolios are designed to be either beta
or currency neutral, or both. Well-designed portfolios typically control for industry,
sector, market capitalisation, and other exposures. Leverage is often applied to
enhance returns.
Multi-Strategy Multi-Strategy funds are characterised by their ability to allocate capital dynamically
among strategies that fall within several traditional hedge fund disciplines. The use of
many strategies, and the ability to reallocate capital between them in response to
market opportunities, means that such funds are not easily assigned to any traditional
category. The Multi-Strategy category also includes funds that employ unique
strategies which do not fall under any of the other descriptions.
Fund of Funds A fund will employ the services of two or more trading advisors or hedge funds who/
which will be allocated cash to trade on behalf of the fund.
Source: CSFB/Tremont Index (see www.hedgeindex.com).
Group Strategy Description11
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INFORMATION IN HEDGE FUND DATABASES
There are three major providers of hedge fund databases commonly used by public bodies: the
Trading Advisors Selection System (TASS), the Centre for International Securities and
Derivatives Markets (CISDM) (former MAR/Hedge) and Hedge Fund Research (HFR). The
different databases cover only part of the global hedge fund industry and to some extent
overlap, as some hedge funds report to more than one data provider. Certain databases may
have strong regional biases. For example, Eurekahedge focuses primarily on Asian hedge
funds. Based on the latest study of hedge fund databases by Strategic Financial Solutions, the
largest and the five largest databases would respectively account for 44% and 84% of around
8,100 hedge funds identified in 12 of the best-known databases.1 Moreover, given the fact that
hedge funds are listed on the stock exchange.
Rising demand from retail investors and
remaining regulatory obstacles for direct
investments have led to the emergence of
indirect investment channels, such as FOHFs
or various performance-linked instruments,
including unit-linked insurance policies and
structured notes (so-called wrappers).
4 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE HEDGE FUND
INDUSTRY
Any information on the activities of hedge
funds is subject to shortcomings, as many
hedge funds are domiciled offshore, face
relatively few information and disclosure
requirements, and provide information only
on a voluntary basis. Nearly every private
database is imperfect, with different and
usually overlapping samples and biases in the
data (see Box 1).
In the following, the term “EU hedge funds”
refers to funds based (domiciled) in the EU and/
or with managers residing in the EU, which
may not necessarily invest exclusively in the
EU markets.8 Sometimes the term “European
hedge funds” may be used by data providers to
identify hedge funds that target exclusively
European markets. This difference in meaning
should be kept in mind when analysing the
various data provided in the text.
From a financial stability perspective, both
views are important, because one relates to
financial institutions, i.e. the asset
management industry operating in Europe, and
the second one to market impact. The first
approach is more common in the case of banks
and other financial institutions, and is
moreover probably more stable compared to
the second one, since hedge funds may change
their geographic orientation swiftly, which is
less the case for the managers’ or fund’s
location. Managers may also exhibit a domestic
bias to some extent.
4.1 LOCATION OF HEDGE FUNDS AND THEIR
MANAGERS
Innovative hedge fund investment strategies
require complete freedom and discretion over
their implementation. Managers therefore look
for minimum regulatory intervention and
favourable tax treatment. Offshore tax havens
are ideal domiciles9 for this purpose, because
they offer a low level of regulation and external
control, and it is relatively easy to set up
and operate a hedge fund there. The Cayman
8 This definition excludes only hedge funds that are managed
from outside the EU and not domiciled in the EU. In this way,
the definition also captures funds that are domiciled in the
EU but managed from outside the EU, and which might
therefore be labelled as non-European funds. For more
details, see Table 5.
9 The domicile is the place where the legal entity of the fund is
located.
1 Strategic Financial Solutions (2004).12
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some of the largest hedge fund families do not report to any database, any individual database
would, at best, cover only 25-30% of funds. It would probably be possible to combine
information from several databases, but this would most likely prove very laborious for the
purpose of a deeper analysis owing to the substantial differences between databases.
Typically, data vendors collect monthly performance data and rely either upon entries by the
hedge fund manager or analyst. The submission of data can lag by several months, and accuracy
is another concern. Time series data include capital under management and returns, while
qualitative information mostly relates to the hedge fund’s strategy, geographic focus, types of
instruments used, leverage, fees, lock-ups, etc.
The data in such databases typically suffer from a number of biases:2
Survivorship bias – this is the statistical bias in performance aggregates due to the inclusion of
only live funds and the exclusion of liquidated, no longer operating, or non-reporting funds.
Reporting can stop not only when a fund falters because of poor returns or excess volatility, but
also because it reaches capacity limits or enjoys good returns and becomes closed to new
investors. According to some estimates, this bias can increase aggregate hedge fund returns by
an additional 2-3%. In this paper, the analysis is based on the combined version of the TASS
database, including both the “Live” and “Graveyard” modules in order to minimise
survivorship effects and to produce historical aggregate data covering both active and inactive
hedge funds.
(Self) selection bias – each database represents only a sample of the whole hedge fund universe.
Funds that do not report due to superior returns offset to some extent the returns of those that do
not report due to poor performance, which can render the bias less important. Hedge funds join
public databases largely for marketing purposes in order to attract additional funds for
investment; only 9% of active hedge funds in the TASS database indicate that they are closed to
new investment. This share has been gradually declining since 1994, when it was 19%.
Instant history or backfill bias occurs when a hedge fund is attached to the database and when a
part or the entire historical performance, which is usually quite positive, is added to the
database. This may contribute an additional 1-3% to the recalculated aggregate returns.
Liquidation bias arises because disappearing funds may not report final periods leading up to
and including their liquidation.
Many vendors publicly provide only a subset of hedge funds tracked internally. As a result, for
example, the public version of the TASS database represents only around four-fifths of funds
and more than half of capital under management of all hedge funds available internally to
Tremont Capital Management Ltd. (TCM), the manager of the database. The larger internal
version is used for proprietary asset management business, consulting and the calculation of
CSFB/Tremont hedge fund indices. Certain aggregate information based on the internal
database is regularly published by TASS Research, the suite of hedge fund research products
owned by TCM. The fact that hedge fund managers not only stop reporting, but also instruct to
remove all their historical information from the public version of the database renders
2 See, for example, Hedges (2004b), Malkiel et al. (2004).13
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aggregate information obtained from the public database unstable.3 For this reason, it is
important to indicate the version of the public database from which aggregate information was
extracted. In this paper, the information was extracted from the TASS database as of 30 June
2005, except for the analysis in the last part of sub-section 6.2.3, which was based on the
24 March 2005 version of the database.
TASS provides fund managers with online access to the fund information, and they can review
and update the data on a daily basis. However, there is no guarantee that the qualitative
information represents the latest changes and some information may even refer to the date
when the fund was included in the database. For example, it is unclear to which date the
information on average and maximum leverage exactly refers. The user should bear this in
mind as only performance and capital under management data are reported as time series. In
addition, there are no details on how hedge funds calculate leverage, as the guidance provided
by the database manager is rather broad (i.e. portfolio to equity).4 Due to high demand for the
leverage data, TCM plans to introduce more informative time series data on this particular
variable.
In the TASS database there is no explicit information on master-feeder structures. Moreover,
without a comparison of individual data or additional information it is difficult to distinguish
different classes of hedge fund shares from separate hedge fund legal entities. This paper, as
most academic studies, therefore treats all entries as individual hedge funds when calculating
aggregate numbers of (funds of) hedge funds.
Furthermore, for some dates hedge funds provide only performance figures, and capital under
management needs to be estimated using previous capital data and the latest returns. However,
even after this estimation, approximately 1-5% of funds (or sometimes even up to 10% of funds
in the case of latest data) have no capital figures on a particular date. All the information in this
paper refers to the narrower data set that includes only funds with reported (estimated) capital
under management. In this way, consistency between aggregate data on the number of hedge
funds and their total capital under management is ensured.
3 When a new hedge fund joins the database, the addition of backfilled data also changes historical aggregate information.
4 Some hedge funds indicate that they use leverage, but state that their average or maximum leverage is zero. To accommodate for
this, in the further analysis a special data group has been created and labelled “leverage 0”.
Islands, the British Virgin Islands, Bermuda
and the Bahamas are the most popular offshore
financial centres. Compared to the global
hedge fund industry (see Chart 1 and Chart 3),
EU hedge funds tend to be more concentrated
offshore and relatively more in the Cayman
Islands, Bermuda and the Channel Islands (see
Chart 2, Chart 4 and Table 3).
Owing to investor demand and the “light
touch” approach adopted by some onshore
regulators, new hedge funds have started to
consider onshore jurisdictions to govern their
operations, including in Luxembourg, Ireland,
France, Italy, Germany and some other
countries. Based on the TASS sample, the share
of hedge funds domiciled in the United States
has been declining for the last ten years.
About 70% of EU hedge funds domiciled in the
EU are established in Luxembourg and Ireland,
with roughly 40% and 30% shares respectively.
These two centres are particularly popular
among hedge funds managed from the United
Kingdom, as hedge funds can be listed on the
Irish or Luxembourg stock exchanges and are14
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thus attractive to investors that are prohibited
from investing outside the EU or in unlisted
securities.
In contrast to hedge funds, their managers
generally reside in major financial centres and
may or may not be registered with local
supervisory authorities. Sometimes they are
required to register because they also manage
Chart 4 Capital under management of EU
hedge funds by domicile
(% of total; end-of-year data)
Source: TASS database (30 June 2005 version).
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Chart 3 Capital under management of hedge
funds globally by domicile
(% of total; end-of-year data)
Source: TASS database (30 June 2005 version).























Chart 2 Number of EU hedge funds by
domicile
(% of total; end-of-year data)
Source: TASS database (30 June 2005 version).
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Chart 1 Number of hedge funds globally by
domicile
(% of total; end-of-year data)
Source: TASS database (30 June 2005 version).

























regulated funds, or they do so to enhance their
credibility in the eyes of investors. Many of
them are former investment bankers or “long-
only” investment managers who aim to run
their own investment business.
Based on TASS data, the global shares of hedge
fund managers located in the EU and offshore
centres have been steadily increasing at the15
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expense of the US managers’ share, both in
terms of number of funds and capital under
management (see Chart 5 to Chart 8). EU hedge
funds are almost entirely managed
from within the EU. More than 60% of the EU
hedge fund managers are located in London
because of its leading role as a financial
centre and the presence of a skilled local
labour force, as well as competitive
infrastructure and support services (see also
Table 4 for data from another source). The
second most popular location is Paris with a
share of roughly 15%.
Putting together the information on the
location of hedge funds and their managers
reveals that the EU segment constitutes
roughly 25-35% of the industry, and its market
Chart 6 Number of EU hedge funds by the
location of managers
(% of total; end-of-year data)
Source: TASS database (30 June 2005 version).
Note: Only funds with reported (estimated) capital under
management.

















Chart 5 Number of hedge funds globally by
the location of managers
(% of total; end-of-year data)
Source: TASS database (30 June 2005 version).
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Chart 8 Capital of EU hedge funds by the
location of managers
(% of total; end-of-year data)
Source: TASS database (30 June 2005 version).
Note: Only funds with reported (estimated) capital under
management.

















Chart 7 Capital of hedge funds globally by
the location of managers
(% of total; end-of-year data)
Source: TASS database (30 June 2005 version).
Note: Only funds with reported (estimated) capital under
management.
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share has been increasing over the last decade.
In contrast to the expansion of single hedge
funds, EU FOHFs have only recently
approached the market share that had prevailed
Country Number of % share
managers of EU15















Total EU15 504 100
Switzerland 36 7
United States 29 6
Norway 4 1
Total 573 114
Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers (2004b) (obtained from
EuroHedge, February 2003).
Table 4 Location of managers managing
European-based single hedge funds
(estimated number of European-based single manager hedge
funds managed from this country at end-2002)
Chart 9 Market share of EU hedge funds
(% of total; end-of-year data)
Source: TASS database (30 June 2005 version).
Note: Only funds with reported (estimated) capital under
management.

























in the mid-1990s (see Chart 9). The mapping of
the industry by domicile and location of
managers is presented in Table 5.
19971) 20022) 20042) 20043)
All EU hedge
% share of offshore hedge funds funds funds
Number of funds 47 40 43 55 64
Capital under management 69 49 49 64 62
% share of offshore hedge fund capital by domicile
Cayman Islands 23 54 - 58 60
British Virgin Islands 21 25 - 20 15
Bermuda 9 10 - 12 15
Bahamas 4 4 - 4 1
Netherlands Antilles 35 - - 2 2
Other 9 7 - 5 8
Sources: 1) Eichengreen et al. (1998) (obtained from MAR/Hedge). 2) International Financial Services, London (2004 and 2005)
(obtained from Van Hedge Fund Advisors International Inc. and the US Offshore Funds Directory). 3) TASS database (30 June 2005
version) (only funds with reported/estimated capital under management).
Table 3 Offshore hedge funds17
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4.2 INCENTIVE STRUCTURE AND FAILURE
RATES
Incentive schemes used by hedge funds are
an important element of their success.
Performance fees are typically asymmetric, as
they reward positive absolute returns without a
corresponding penalty for negative returns.
However, in instances where managers commit
their own money, the preservation of capital is
very important and the motivation to take
excessive risks is to some extent curtailed.
Unlike hedge fund managers, traditional fund
managers may lose flow income in case of poor
Chart 10 Attrition rates by strategy
(percentages; averages of annual attrition rates over
1994-2003)




by capital under management
rates, % ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ $50m $50-150m > $150m 1994-19982)
1-year 3.5 3.8 2.0 1.5
2-year 8.5 10.2 2.8 4.6
3-year 11.8 20.4 2.9 19.6
4-year 18.9 34.5 3.6 33.0
5-year 23.7 38.7 3.6 42.3
6-year 27.2 53.0 3.6 -
7-year 32.0 66.0 3.6 -
Sources: 1) Hedges (2004a). 2) US President’s Working Group
on Financial Markets (1999), p. A-5.
Note: For the methodologies applied, please consult the
indicated sources.
Table 6 Hedge fund failure rates
fund performance, but they do not suffer an
immediate loss to their existing wealth. It is not
unusual for a hedge fund manager to receive
his/her first performance compensation only
after one or two years due to high watermarks10
and hurdle rates.11
10 A watermark is a fund valuation below which performance
fees are not paid. With a high watermark, performance
(incentive) fees are paid only if cumulative performance
recovers any past shortfalls. Therefore, a hedge fund
manager who loses in the first year and then merely regains
that loss in the second year will not receive an incentive
payment for the second year’s gain.
11 The hurdle rate is the minimum return that must be generated

























Source: TASS database (30 June 2005 version).
Notes: The shaded areas refer to the shares of EU hedge funds. Only funds with reported (estimated) capital under management.
Table 5 Mapping of the hedge fund industry by domicile and location of managers
(end-2004)
Domicile of hedge funds
Number, % of total Capital under management, % of total
Location of hedge Offshore Offshore
fund managers EU US centres Other Total EU US centres Other Total
EU 71 1 6 ... 23 8 ... 18 ... 27
US 1 33 21 ... 54 1 23 29 ... 53
Offshore centres 1 ... 13 ... 14 1 ... 12 ... 13
Other 1 ... 5 2 8 1 ... 6 1 7
Total 9 34 55 2 100 11 24 64 1 10018
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Hedge fund survival rates are rather low, and
failure rates for the sample of hedge funds in
the first year of the period used for the
estimation typically range between 2% and 4%
(see Table 6). According to another study, the
average annual attrition rate in the TASS
database over the sample period 1994-2003
was 8.8%,12 although other market estimates
put the figure at about 5%.13 Not surprisingly,
macro, managed futures and other hedge funds
with volatile returns show the highest attrition
rates (and the lowest survival rates14) (see
Chart 10). Frequently hedge funds also close
for reasons unrelated to poor performance,
such as mergers, restructurings or the departure
of key managers. The incentive structure, in
particular the presence of high watermarks, is
equally responsible for the high rates of
attrition. Indeed, it is not economic for
managers to continue operating a fund that has
suffered large losses, making the prospect of
receiving performance fees in the future  very
remote.
4.3 PARTIES INVOLVED
Hedge fund managers are typically reluctant to
undertake administrative duties and prefer to
concentrate on their proprietary investment
strategies. Support services are therefore often
outsourced to administrators, in particular by
smaller funds. Administrators handle a variety
of tasks, including the setting up of a hedge
fund, the valuation and calculation of its net
asset value, record-keeping and accounting,
legal advice, reporting and the processing of
investor transactions. Administrators are
usually hired by offshore hedge funds; onshore
hedge funds tend to rely on prime brokers for
operational support, although this is changing
as well. In the TASS database, about 75% of
funds provide information on their
administrators.
Prime brokers are banks or securities firms
offering brokerage and other professional
services to hedge funds and other large
institutional clients. Prime brokerage services
involve financing, clearing and settlement of
12 Chan et al. (2005).
13 See, for example, the press release of 3 February 2005 at
http://www.hennesseegroup.com
14 US President’s Working Group on Financial Markets (1999),
p. A-4.
15 Atiyah and Walters (2004).
16 PricewaterhouseCoopers (2004a), p. 10 and p. 61.
trades, custodial services, risk management
and operational support facilities. Clients may
also be offered access to research and
consulting services. For new hedge funds,
capital introduction services, whereby prime
brokers introduce managers to potential
investors, may be particularly vital. The major
share of prime brokers’ income comes from
trading commissions, collateralised cash
lending and stock or bond lending to facilitate
short-selling.
The assets of a hedge fund are sometimes
deposited with a custodian bank instead of a
prime or clearing broker. Compared to the
latter, a custodian bank is subject to fiduciary
duties and has an obligation to protect the
fund’s assets and to act in its best interests.
This arrangement provides an additional
safeguard to hedge fund investors, as the prime
broker holds fund assets largely as a principal
and as a security against underlying fund
positions, i.e. mainly to protect its own
interests.15 The typical hedge fund structure is
depicted in Chart 11, although this is only a
simplification of structures that are sometimes
very complex.16




Feeder fund A Feeder fund B
Investors A Investors B
Prime broker
Custodian bank
Note: Dashed lines indicate optional relationships.19
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Hedge funds generally secure investors
through word of mouth, consultants, registered
representatives, brokers or investment
advisors. According to Deutsche Bank’s 2004
Alternative Investment Survey, more than 40%
of investors identify new hedge fund managers
by word of mouth and through prime brokers
(see Table 7).
For a long time, high net worth individuals
were the dominant source of funds for hedge
funds (see Chart 12) and this fact,
Network (word of mouth) 22
Prime brokers 19
From actual managers 16
Third-party marketers 13





Table 7 How investors typically learn of new
managers
(% of total)
Source: Deutsche Bank (2004).
Chart 12 Hedge fund investors
(% of total; 1992 and 1996-2004; end-of-year data)
Source: Gradante (2003) and Hennessee Group.
Note: 1992 data from International Financial Services,




















notwithstanding the LTCM debacle, diluted
concerns about the systemic importance of
hedge funds. However, growing knowledge
concerning hedge fund products and their risk-
adjusted diversification properties has also
prompted demand from institutional investors.
The low interest rate environment and the
associated “hunt for yield” that characterised
financial markets from 2003 also contributed to
this evolution.17 For example, a survey
commissioned by Pioneer Investments
revealed that nearly 50% of UK pension
Liquidity risk Limited ability to withdraw money at short notice, given that lengthy lock-up periods or other
redemption constraints are in place.
Valuation risk Although generally valuation of hedge fund assets is outsourced to administrators or prime
brokers, the manager retains the final right to modify asset values and hedge fund performance
may be misrepresented.
Human risk The success of a hedge fund depends on key people managing it; the departure of certain managers
may therefore adversely affect future performance.
Style drift risk The risk that the manager may change or abandon the stated primary strategy or strategies without
informing investors; the future risk-return profile, correlation with other asset classes may no
longer suit the investor portfolio.
Size risk Some strategies may no longer be viable when assets under management exceed a certain
threshold.
Table 8 Investor risks
Source: Adapted from Bernstein (2002).
17 European Central Bank (2004 and 2005).20
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% of number under $5m $5-25m $25-100m $100-500m over $500m
2002 16 29 32 19 4
2003 10 28 32 24 6
Sources: PricewaterhouseCoopers (2004a) and International Financial Services, London (2005) (in both cases obtained from Van
Hedge Fund Advisors International Inc.).
Table 10 Hedge fund size
Offshore funds All funds EU funds
2004 1) ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ $100m $100m-$1bn > $1bn ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ $100m $100m-$1bn > $1bn ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ $100m $100m-$1bn > $1bn
% of number 63 35 3 67 31 2 59 39 2
% of capital 12 65 23 15 66 20 12 69 19
average size $m 31 310 1,433 31 302 1,416 34 293 1,334
2002 2)
% of number 64 33 3 - - - - - -
% of capital 9 48 43 - - - - - -
average size $m 32 304 2,687 - - - - - -
Sources: 1) TASS database (30 June 2005 version) (only funds with reported/estimated capital under management).  2) International
Financial Services, London (2004) (obtained from the US Offshore Funds Directory).
Table 9 Hedge funds by size of fund
managers either invest money in hedge funds or
plan to do so.18 The appetite to invest in hedge
funds is, however, not uniform across
institutional investors. Pension funds and
endowments are reported as showing
significant interest, but this seems to be less the
case for insurance companies, at least in
Europe. European insurers are said to allocate
only 1-2% of their portfolios to hedge funds,
although they are rethinking their strategies
and do plan to increase allocations.19
Investing in hedge funds carries several forms
of risk. Apart from performance risk, hedge
fund investors face a variety of other risks,
some of which relate to the integrity of
managers (see Table 8).
4.5 FUND SIZE
Most hedge funds are relatively small: the vast
majority has less than USD 100 million of
capital under management, while nearly half
have even less than USD 25 million (see Table 9
and Table 10, Chart 13 to Chart 16 and Annex A,
Tables A1 and A2). EU hedge funds (i.e. funds
managed from or based in the EU) do not differ
significantly from their peers in this respect,
but are generally smaller, particularly when
compared with offshore hedge funds. At the
end of 2004, there were 65 hedge funds in the
TASS database with assets under management
exceeding USD 1 billion. Of those 19, or more
than one quarter, were EU hedge funds.
There is no conclusive evidence on whether
size matters for hedge fund returns, although
there are indications that smaller hedge funds
seem to outperform larger ones, while mid-
sized funds lag both other groups. This
suggests the phenomenon of a “mid-life crisis”
for hedge fund managers which is related to the
growth of their capital under management.20
The link, of course, may vary depending on the
hedge fund strategy, and macro hedge funds
seem to be an exception.
18 Bradbery (2004).
19 Wolcott (2004).
20 Hedges  (2004a).21
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Chart 14 Number of EU hedge funds by
strategy and size
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Source: TASS database (30 June 2005 version).
Note: Only funds with reported (estimated) capital under
management.
Chart 13 Number of hedge funds globally by
strategy and size


















































Source: TASS database (30 June 2005 version).
Note: Only funds with reported (estimated) capital under
management.
Chart 16 Capital of EU hedge funds by
strategy and size
























































Source: TASS database (30 June 2005 version).
Note: Only funds with reported (estimated) capital under
management.
Chart 15 Capital of hedge funds globally by
strategy and size
(% of total; December 2004)
Source: TASS database (30 June 2005 version).
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5 RECENT EVOLUTION OF THE HEDGE FUND
BUSINESS
In an environment of low interest rates and low
returns in financial markets, investors have
been searching for alternative investments to
improve risk-adjusted returns. In this regard,
hedge funds represent a natural candidate. All
data sources confirm strong growth in the
number of hedge funds and capital under
management (see Chart 18 and Annex A,
Tables A1-A4). According to TASS Research,
inflows into the hedge fund industry in 2004
continued to surpass previous records,
reaching USD 123 billion (excluding FOHFs)
(see Chart 17). The latest estimates of the total
capital under management are over USD 1
trillion, a figure which furthermore does not
include managed accounts accepted by hedge
fund managers and managed using hedge fund-
like strategies (totalling around USD 300
billion at the end of 2004, according to TASS
Research).
Between 1993 and 2004, hedge fund capital
under management grew at an annualised
compound growth rate of 27%. In this period
there were only a few quarters with negative
inflows, the most notable of which were two
consecutive quarters starting at the end of
1998, just after the near collapse of LTCM. The
LTCM episode seriously shook the industry,
but proved to be only a temporary setback to an
accelerating long-term trend.
In 2004, all strategies recorded positive inflows.
Funds with directional strategies preserved their
market share of total capital under management,
although their share had been on a downward
trend from 1994 onwards, which was largely due
to a decline of global macro funds (see Chart 19).
Since 1995, long/short equity hedge funds have
remained the largest single strategy and
represented around one-third of the industry at
the end of 2004 (see Chart 20). Event driven and
market neutral strategies have gained in
importance during the last decade, but during the
last two years, even these strategies were
outpaced by other (mostly multi-strategy) funds.
The last six quarters were also quite successful
for event driven funds.
According to International Financial Services,
London (IFSL) estimates, at the end of 2004
most capital under management came from the
United States (69%), although Europe (23%),
Asia (5%) and other regions (3%) are becoming
more important sources of funds.21
Investors bring in new funds mainly on the
assumption that past returns will continue to be
realised (see Chart 21 and Chart 22). However,
it is questionable whether hedge funds will be
able to maintain their impressive historical
track record as the number of new hedge funds
increases, potentially leading to an increasing
number of managers trying to exploit the same
market opportunities, possibly also relying
upon similar models.
A pattern of segmentation appears among
single hedge funds, some of which prefer to
deal only with institutional investors or
FOHFs, whereas others have been trying to
maintain a more or less balanced investor
structure with high net worth individuals
still accounting for a significant share of
total capital under management. However,
according to market participants, institutional
investors do not look at small hedge funds
or provide seed capital. Many institutional
investors have a minimum size of allocation in
absolute terms and limit their investments in
relation to the total capital under management
of a target hedge fund. The current trend is
that smaller hedge funds with less than
USD 100 million under management usually
obtain funds from FOHFs, while the larger
ones with USD 1 billion take money directly
from institutional investors.22
The role of FOHFs has been increasing, and
they should provide investors with an
additional layer of due diligence and
diversification (see Chart 23). However, there
21 International Financial Services, London (2005).
22 Barclays Capital (2003) and Deutsche Bank (2005).23
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is little evidence as to how effectively they
perform this task and how well they are
diversified.23 In order to guarantee minimum
diversification, German FOHFs, for example,
can allocate no more than 20% of their capital
under management to a single hedge fund.
FOHFs are the main vehicle for the
“retailisation” of the hedge fund industry, and
in some European countries, only FOHFs are
allowed for public offering. There are some
concerns that retail investors fail to realise or
are not informed properly that FOHF fees are
levied on top of the fees charged by underlying
hedge funds – which can indeed have a
significant impact on final FOHF returns.
The hedge fund industry has also become
increasingly institutionalised. Banks have
been setting up their own hedge funds in order
Chart 17 Hedge fund inflows by strategy






















Chart 18 Hedge fund capital under
management by strategy


























Chart 19 Hedge fund capital structure by
strategy



























Chart 20 Hedge fund capital structure by
strategy























23 According to Deutsche Bank’s 2005 Alternative Investment
Survey, 80% of FOHFs were invested in more than 20 hedge
funds, 15% in 6-20 and 6% in less than 6 hedge funds.24
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24 Barclays Capital (2003) and Radley & Associates (2005).
to offer investors the full spectrum of available
traditional and alternative investments. They
have also been seeking to participate in what
might prove to be a structural change in the
asset management industry.
The costs of running a hedge fund are
increasing, as managers face more complex
regulatory, taxation and anti-money laundering
issues. The minimum investments with regard
to infrastructure and risk management systems
are also higher, although the total initial costs
are still relatively manageable. Some market
participants indicate that it is uneconomic to
operate a hedge fund with less than USD
50-100 million under management and a deal
involving a 2% management fee and a 20%
performance fee.24 Only larger hedge funds can
benefit from economies of scale, so the hedge
fund industry will most probably become
increasingly concentrated over time. The
entrance of banks with their own hedge funds
may further contribute to this trend.
Lured by high performance fees, many talented
bankers and traditional fund managers are now
leaving for hedge funds, which raises the
question of whether remaining staff will be
able to cope with the new challenges.
Investment banks have reacted to this “brain
drain” by setting up in-house hedge funds and
by offering their staff more attractive
compensation schemes. The size of assets
managed by traditional financial institutions
continues to be higher than those of hedge
funds by a very large margin. It is therefore
important that this evolution does not hamper
the stability and the financial intermediation
role of the traditional fund management
business.
The recent expansion in hedge funds will
certainly affect the global asset management
industry, and public authorities will have to
Chart 21 Hedge fund and stock market
performance
(index: December 1993 = 100; in USD; January 1994-December
2004; monthly data)
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Chart 22 Hedge fund, stock and bond
markets performance in 2004
(%; in USD; January-December 2004)
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Sources: Datastream and Bloomberg.25
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IMPLICATIONS Chart 23 The importance of FOHFs
(FOHFs as a % of single hedge funds; 1994-2004;
end-of-year data)
Source: TASS database (30 June 2005 version).
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decide on the appropriate regulatory
framework that leaves them more or less
comfortable with this new business model. It
might also be argued that differences between
the traditional fund management industry and
hedge funds may become increasingly blurred,
as conventional funds start using hedge fund
investment techniques and hedge funds are
forced to lower their fees.
6 FINANCIAL STABILITY IMPLICATIONS
6.1 POSSIBLE POSITIVE EFFECTS
The overall size of hedge funds is still
relatively limited, but their active role in
markets makes them much more important than
their size alone. Every additional market
participant provides complementary liquidity
to the market. However, the input of hedge
funds is very significant, as they often take
alternative market views, can leverage their
positions and change their portfolio
composition much more frequently than
traditional funds. They thrive on perceived
inefficiencies by arbitraging away price
differences for the same risk across markets. In
this way, hedge funds contribute to the price
discovery process. It might also be argued that,
in this way, hedge funds have contributed to the
further integration of financial markets.
Hedge funds also tend to be risk-takers in a
number of markets. This is especially the case
in fledgling and sophisticated markets, where
risks are more difficult to quantify and hedge
fund managers have a competitive edge
because of their superior models. The credit
derivatives market is just one example of such a
market. According to the British Bankers’
Association, hedge funds’ share as sellers in
the credit derivatives market has surged from
5% in 2001 to 15% in 2003, while their share
as buyers rose in the same period from 12%
to 16%.25 According to another survey by
Greenwich Associates, hedge funds account
for 15-30% of the trading volume in each of
the high yield bond, credit derivatives,
collateralised debt obligations (CDO),
emerging bond, leveraged loans markets and
for more than 80% of trading in distressed
debt.26 More regulated financial institutions are
usually reluctant to be exposed to such risks
and prefer to earn fees or other types of income
with lower risks. The presence of hedge funds
as active market participants contributes to the
development and liquidity of new specialised
over-the-counter (OTC) markets, leads to the
development of better risk management tools,
and enhances the spreading of risks among
market participants.
It has been argued that hedge funds’ activity
may lead to lower market volatility because
they are less likely to engage in “momentum
trading” (i.e. buying into a rising market and
selling into a falling one) and impose longer
redemption horizons on their investors.
Another element that may support this
argument is that they are willing to put their
capital at risk in volatile market conditions so
that market shocks can be absorbed. Through
their ability to engage in short-selling and to
25 British Bankers’ Association (2004).
26 Fitch Ratings (2005).26
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take contrarian approaches, they may also act
as a counterbalance to market herding.
In addition, hedge funds seem to provide
attractive diversification benefits (see Table 11).
Based on data from the past 11 years, all
correlation coefficients between CSFB/Tremont
Hedge Fund family indices and major stock
market indices were below 0.61 and even
negative in the case of dedicated short bias and
managed futures strategies.
The case for the inclusion of hedge funds into
an investor’s portfolio becomes even more
compelling when historical risk-adjusted
returns are taken into account. With the
exception of certain directional strategies,
other hedge fund strategies seem to outperform
stock and bond markets on a risk-adjusted basis
(see Chart 24 and Chart 25). Thus, new
combinations in the risk-return space can be
achieved with hedge funds, thereby increasing
the completeness of financial markets. This
should ultimately also result in greater social
welfare. However, the evidence that hedge
funds outperform the market is not yet
conclusive, as there are many reservations with
respect to the accuracy of hedge fund indices
and the sensitivity of comparisons to the choice
of the sample period. Moreover, reported hedge
fund returns could be smoother than true
economic returns possibly because of greater
Table 11 Correlation matrix of hedge fund, stock and bond market returns




















GBI Europe $ -0.10 0.32 0.20 -0.08 -0.10 -0.05 -0.18 -0.08
GBI EMU $ -0.12 0.31 0.16 -0.12 -0.13 -0.08 -0.20 -0.11
GBI US $ 0.12 0.32 0.01 0.12 0.06 0.10 -0.13 -0.06
GBI Global $ -0.07 0.30 0.15 0.06 -0.10 -0.10 -0.18 -0.06
Stock indices
MSCI World Equity $ 0.47 0.16 0.12 0.35 0.10 0.03 0.51 0.57
S&P 500 0.48 0.08 0.07 0.39 0.13 0.03 0.48 0.55





Long/Short 0.78 0.70 0.15 0.34 0.26 0.20 0.64 0.58
Short Bias -0.48 -0.36 -0.07 -0.33 -0.23 -0.08 -0.55 -0.63
Global Macro 0.86 0.53 0.12 0.21 0.29 0.45 0.42 0.31
Emerging 0.65 0.46 -0.03 0.22 0.31 0.29 0.68 0.59
Futures 0.12 0.47 -0.01 0.12 -0.19 -0.07 -0.22 -0.14
Event
Driven
Total 0.66 0.56 0.17 0.36 0.58 0.39 0.93 0.94
Risk Arbitrage 0.39 0.50 0.07 0.30 0.40 0.13 0.65 0.56
Distressed 0.57 0.45 0.12 0.33 0.50 0.31 0.76 1
ED Multi-Strategy 0.68 0.59 0.21 0.34 0.59 0.43 1
Market 
Neutral
FI Arbitrage 0.45 0.31 0.27 0.07 0.53 1
Convertible 0.40 0.38 0.35 0.32 1
Market Neutral 0.33 0.10 0.20 1
Multi-Strategy 0.17 0.49 1
Investable 0.78 1
CSFB/Tremont Index 1
Sources: Datastream, Bloomberg and own calculations.
Notes: CSFB/Tremont Index and sub-indices begin in January 1994, except Multi-Strategy, which began in April 1994, and Investable, which began 
in January 2000. GBI EMU $ began in January 1995. Given 132 observation pairs (monthly returns for 11 years) and a 5% (1%) confidence level, 
statistically significant (i.e. different from zero) module values of pairwise correlation coefficients should exceed 0.17 (0.22).27
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exposures to illiquid positions and the less
frequent pricing of these exposures.27
6.2 POSSIBLE NEGATIVE EFFECTS
The near-collapse of LTCM (see Box 2)
underscores how hedge fund activities can harm
financial institutions and markets. A sequence
of negative events can start with losses on
leveraged market positions. Liquidity shortages
then come into play, which are further
exacerbated by asset illiquidity in stressed
markets. Thus, leveraged market risk can, if not
supported by adequate liquidity reserves or
borrowing capacity, force a fund to default on its
obligations to prime brokers and other financial
institutions. The spill-over effect on markets
depends on the fund’s size and the relative
importance of its positions in certain markets.
The sequence of negative events can also be
triggered by mass exits from markets where
hedge funds and proprietary trading desks of
large banks have taken relatively similar
positions. The concentrations, linkages and
spill-over effects could therefore ultimately lead
to a systemic crisis.
To structure the analysis, it is useful to
distinguish three channels through which
hedge funds could affect financial stability.
27 Getmansky et al. (2003).
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First, the failure of a large individual or a group
of hedge funds could lead to far-reaching
repercussions for exposed banks and financial
markets. Second, the serious mismanagement
of exposures to hedge funds at an individual
bank or banks might lead to a systemic crisis
via contagion effects. Third, instability could
be initiated through the impact of hedge fund
activities on financial markets. A triggering
event could be associated with any of these
channels and instability could be further
escalated by the vicious cycle of reinforcing
ripple effects on other channels.
6.2.1 THROUGH LEVERAGE AND LIQUIDITY
RISKS OF HEDGE FUNDS
Hedge funds obtain leverage in a number of
ways, but they typically prefer derivatives and
other arrangements where positions are
established by posting margins rather than the
full face value of a position. Repurchase
agreements and short sales are also quite
popular techniques. Direct credit in the form of
loans is rather uncommon, but credit lines for
liquidity purposes are widely used.
Chart 24 Return-to-risk ratios
(annualised compound rate of return divided by annualised
volatility of monthly returns; January 1994-December 2004;
monthly data)
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Sources: Datastream, Bloomberg and own calculations.
Notes: CSFB/Tremont Index and sub-indices begin in
January 1994, except Multi-Strategy, which began in April
1994 and Investable, which began in January 2000. GBI EMU
$ began in January 1995.
Chart 25 Hedge fund returns and volatility
(%; in USD; January 1994-December 2004; monthly data)
Sources: Datastream, Bloomberg and own calculations.
Notes: CSFB/Tremont Index and sub-indices begin in January 1994, except Multi-Strategy, which began in April 1994 and
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THE LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (LTCM) EPISODE
The near-default of LTCM in September 1998 and its fall-out on world financial markets
brought hedge funds to the attention of the global financial community. LTCM was founded in
early 1994 as a Delaware limited liability partnership, and its main fund, Long-Term Capital
Portfolio, was domiciled in the Cayman Islands. Many prominent names from Wall Street and
academia were present among its principals and investors, including Nobel Prize laureate
Myron Scholes. At the beginning of 1998, LTCM managed approximately USD 4.8 billion of
assets.
LTCM used sophisticated relative value arbitrage strategies in global fixed income and equity
index markets. These strategies relied heavily on quantitative models and past correlations
between financial market variables. LTCM managers were taking market positions on the
assumption that liquidity, credit and volatility spreads would narrow from their historically
high levels. For a long time this strategy worked well. A favourable macroeconomic
environment, the worldwide decline in inflation and a substantial convergence in interest rates
associated with the prospect of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) all led to a substantial
compression of nominal yields and risk spreads in the industrial economies. These market
positions were supported by extremely high leverage, with balance sheet assets being more
than 25 times higher than equity. Notwithstanding its limited disclosure, the fund’s impressive
track record and reputation of its principals ensured very favourable credit terms, while the
large trading volume made the fund a very desirable counterparty.
The Russian debt crisis, however, caused global interest rate anomalies, as investors rushed
into a “flight-to-quality” and spreads on riskier debt widened dramatically. Past correlations
between financial markets broke down, LTCM investments began to lose value, and the fund
was forced to unwind its positions at very unfavourable prices in order to meet margin calls and
satisfy other liquidity demands. The problems were compounded by the sheer size of the LTCM
positions in certain markets. At the end of August 1998, LTCM had already lost over 50% of its
equity. What started as a pure liquidity crisis could have led to default, but a meltdown was
avoided when the Federal Reserve coordinated a bailout by the consortium of the fund’s 14
main bankers. Insolvency would have led to even larger losses to creditors and further
disruptions in then already very fragile markets.
Most of the resources provided by prime brokers to LTCM were collateralised and collateral
agreements required frequent marking to market. Prime brokers therefore did not see the need
to impose tight limits on current credit exposures. The LTCM case, however, highlighted the
fact that market participants had failed to account for potential future credit exposures arising
from the interaction of the market, market liquidity and credit risks. None of the prime brokers
was aware of the full size and the riskiness of the LTCM portfolio. Advantageous credit terms
evaporated quickly under stressed conditions, as creditors changed their stance dramatically,
which further magnified the severity of the liquidity shortage.30
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A number of possible measures of leverage are
given in Table 12. Accounting-based balance
sheet measures of leverage fail to reflect the
risk of the assets. Risk-based measures
alleviate this shortcoming by relating market
risk to the capacity to absorb it. However, risk-
based leverage measures, even adjusted for
potential asset illiquidity, do not capture the
funding liquidity risks arising from margin
calls, redemptions or financing mismatches.
The LTCM episode clearly underscored the
role of funding liquidity in escalating the
effects of otherwise acceptable losses on
market positions. Hence, leveraged market risk
should be evaluated in conjunction with the
liquidity risk stemming from asset illiquidity
and funding risks.
Data in the TASS database seem to confirm that
fixed income arbitrage and convertible arbitrage
strategies tend to have the highest leverage (see
Chart 26 and Chart 27), although the degree of
leverage in the third market neutral strategy,
equity market neutral, does not seem to be very
high.28 Managed futures, global macro and multi-
Leverage measures
Accounting-based
Gross on-balance sheet leverage Total on-balance sheet assets/Equity
Net on-balance sheet leverage (Total on-balance sheet assets – Matched book assets)/Equity
Gross accounting leverage (Total on-balance sheet assets + Total on-balance sheet liabilities
+ Gross off-balance sheet transactions)/Equity
Gross economic leverage (Risky assets + Risky liabilities + Gross off-balance sheet notional)/Equity
Net economic leverage (Risky assets – matched book assets + Risky liabilities – Matched book liabilities
+ Gross off-balance sheet notional – Hedges)/Equity
Risk-based
VaR leverage VaR/Equity
Scenario (stress) VaR leverage Scenario (stress test) derived VaR/Equity
Asset liquidity-adjusted VaR leverage VaR with liquidation horizon scaled volatilities/Equity
Liquidity measures
Absolute liquidity Cash
Cash + Borrowing capacity
Relative measures Cash/Equity
(Cash + Borrowing capacity)/Equity
VaR/(Cash + Borrowing capacity)
Table 12 Examples of leverage and liquidity measures
Sources: Managed Funds Association (2005) and Financial Stability Forum (2000).
strategy funds are also intensive users of
leverage, with the first two of these strategies
relying extensively on derivatives to acquire the
desired exposures. As a rule, FOHFs do not seem
to be highly leveraged, although some of them
use leverage in excess of 200.29 FOHF products
with capital protection are quite popular among
risk-averse institutional investors, but the design
of such products30 also implies that the FOHFs
will have to employ leverage to achieve targeted
returns.
28 Tremont Capital Management, the manager of the TASS
database, guides hedge funds to calculate leverage as a ratio
of hedge fund portfolio to equity, multiplied by 100. There is
a difference between “no leverage” and “average leverage 0”
as some hedge funds indicate that they use leverage, but state
that their average leverage is zero.
29 Based on Deutsche Bank’s 2005 Alternative Investment
Survey, 41% of FOHFs do not use leverage, 41% use leverage
and 18% do not use leverage, but are interested in doing so in
the future.
30 For example, 60% of attracted capital is invested in zero
coupon bonds maturing after 10-12 years, and the remaining
40% is invested in underlying hedge funds. An investor is
guaranteed to receive 100% of the initial investment, provided
the investment is held until the maturity of the zero coupon
bonds. However, 40% of the initial investment has to be
invested in a way that could earn 8-12% on the 100% of initial
investment; therefore, the use of leverage is inevitable.31
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IMPLICATIONS Chart 26 Hedge fund leverage by strategy
(% of number of funds; distribution of average leverage;
December 2004)
Source: TASS database (30 June 2005 version).

















































Chart 27 Hedge fund leverage by strategy
(% of capital under management; distribution of average
leverage; December 2004)
Source: TASS database (30 June 2005 version).
Note: Only funds with reported (estimated) capital under
management.














































Chart 28 Single hedge fund leverage by size
(% of capital under management; distribution of average
leverage; December 2004)
Source: TASS database (30 June 2005 version).
Note: Only funds with reported (estimated) capital under
management.


















Chart 29 FOHF leverage by size
(% of capital under management; distribution of average
leverage; December 2004)
Source: TASS database (30 June 2005 version).

















Occasional Paper No. 34
August 2005
Chart 30 Single hedge fund leverage and
capital by vintage year
(% of capital under management; distribution of average
leverage and total capital; only funds with reported/estimated
capital under management in December 2004)
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Chart 31 FOHF leverage and capital by
vintage year
(% of capital under management; distribution of average
leverage and total capital; only funds with reported/estimated
capital under management in December 2004)




















Leverage seems to vary greatly by hedge fund
size, and the largest single hedge funds, with
more than USD 1 billion of capital under
management (51 hedge funds), tend to exhibit
higher levels of leverage. In the latter group,
the share of hedge fund capital with a leverage
factor of more than 200 is 23% – the highest
among all size groups (see Chart 28). By
contrast, the largest FOHFs (14 FOHFs) do not
seem to use leverage at all, although some
smaller ones do (see Chart 29).
The information presented so far does not
provide an insight into the evolution of
leverage. Notwithstanding data limitations
(see  Box 1), it is possible to analyse how
leverage varies among active funds with
different vintage (inception) years.
Interestingly, older single hedge funds,
perhaps managed by more experienced
managers, tend to be more leveraged than
newer ones (see Chart 30 and Chart 31),
providing some support for the view that
leverage across the hedge fund industry has
probably declined and is presently lower than
at the time of the near-failure of LTCM.31
If this prevalent view is correct, then the
potential for forced liquidations of hedge fund
positions in times of stress seems to be lower.
With excessive leverage, even a moderate price
swing could force hedge funds to liquidate their
leveraged positions to meet margin calls,
potentially leading to ripple effects across a
number of markets. Most lending by banks is
short-term, which in combination with high
leverage further decreases the ability to wait
until a possible price recovery. However, the
analysis of a possible market impact should
also incorporate the leverage and positions of
proprietary trading desks of regulated banks
and securities firms, since they may adopt
hedge fund-like strategies.
31 The same conclusion has been reached by McGuire et al.
(2005) from the BIS, who used hedge fund style analysis to
yield a time-varying indicators of leverage.33
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Obtaining data on hedge fund liquidity
parameters is also problematic, although
certain insights may nevertheless be gained by
examining funding risks and in particular the
vulnerability of hedge funds to sudden investor
withdrawals. Compared to hedge funds, banks
and securities firms have more diverse and
stable sources of revenue and funding,
although this may, to some extent, be offset by
more inflexible cost structures and the higher
amount of illiquid assets.
According to TASS data on lock-up periods,
redemption frequency and redemption notice
periods, managed futures and global macro
funds may be relatively more vulnerable to
investor panic, although their investment
portfolios most likely consist of rather liquid
assets (see Chart 32, Chart 34 and Chart 36).
Fixed income and convertible arbitrage funds,
which both use the highest leverage, are
positioned broadly in line with, or even slightly
better than, the overall industry.
It would be prudent for hedge funds with less
liquid investments to take appropriate protective
measures. These could, for example, include
lengthier lock-up periods, less frequent
redemptions, longer redemption notice periods,
and higher liquidity reserves or credit lines for
unforeseen liquidity shortages. There are some
indications that hedge funds specialising in
market neutral and event driven strategies tend
to have more illiquid and complex positions.
However, according to TASS data, these
strategies are also associated with longer lock-up
periods, less frequent redemptions and longer
redemption notice periods. The longer-term trend
for the whole hedge fund industry is that lock-up
periods have been slowly becoming more
widespread32 and redemption notice periods
have been lengthening. At the same time, the
redemption frequency has been increasing and,
Chart 32 Hedge fund lock-up periods by
strategy
(% of capital under management; December 2004)
Source: TASS database (30 June 2005 version).
Note: Only funds with reported (estimated) capital under
management.


















































Chart 33 Evolution of single hedge fund
lock-up periods
(% of capital under management; 1994-2004;
end-of-year data)
Source: TASS database (30 June 2005 version).
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32 Longer lock-ups also ensure that management fees will bring
more revenue and allow hedge fund managers to promise
better pay packages for the most talented traders and other
professionals.34
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Chart 34 Hedge fund redemption frequency
by strategy
(% of capital under management; December 2004)
Source: TASS database (30 June 2005 version).
























































Chart 35 Evolution of single hedge fund
redemption frequency
(% of capital under management; 1994-2004;
end-of-year data)
Source: TASS database (30 June 2005 version).
Note: Only funds with reported (estimated) capital under
management.
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Chart 36 Hedge fund redemption notice
periods by strategy
(% of capital under management; December 2004)
Source: TASS database (30 June 2005 version).
Note: Only funds with reported (estimated) capital under
management.





















































Chart 37 Evolution of single hedge fund
redemption notice periods
(% of capital under management; 1994-2004;
end-of-year data)
Source: TASS database (30 June 2005 version).
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in particular, monthly and quarterly redemption
frequencies are becoming an industry standard,
though in combination with longer three month
redemption notice periods (see Chart 33, Chart
35 and Chart 37, which assume that hedge funds’
redemption profiles, as indicated in the TASS
database, have been the same throughout their
entire operating history).
Redemption notice periods can effectively help
to lock investors’ money until the second
closest redemption if the investor misses the
deadline in applying for the closest
redemption. However, certain hedge funds also
offer investors the opportunity to exit at short
notice with a certain penalty (the so-called
“gate” fee).
Market risk, leverage and liquidity risk may
interact among each other, so a vulnerability
analysis should ideally seek to identify
possible combinations and concentrations of
high volatility, high leverage, higher funding
risks and larger hedge fund size. For
illustration, a comparison of volatilities of
hedge fund, stock and bond market returns is
presented in Chart 38. It is, however, based on
monthly returns and may not represent the true
riskiness of hedge fund portfolios.
There are concerns that prolonged periods of
mediocre performance may encourage hedge
fund managers to employ greater leverage or
more aggressive strategies. Capital could flow
out following poor performance, so that hedge
funds would be forced to liquidate positions.
This could lead to a market-wide disinvestment
spiral, potentially resulting in systemic risk.
A number of mitigating factors are, however,
also at play. Institutional investors and FOHFs,
which already account for half of the capital
managed by hedge funds, should now have a
better understanding of hedge fund operations.
Hence, they may be more patient when
confronted with temporary underperformance.
Moreover, lengthy lock-up periods and less
frequent redemption schedules could provide
more time for hedge funds to recoup past
shortfalls and settle their liabilities. However,
the proliferation of FOHFs, which generally
provide the possibility of monthly redemption,
could mean that more flexible redemption
profiles may be demanded from the underlying
hedge funds. Some of the institutional
investors that only recently started investing in
hedge funds may also be less willing to accept
lower liquidity of their allocations to hedge
funds.33 Thus, the hedge fund industry may risk
losing one of its defensive features, i.e. lengthy
lock-up periods and infrequent redemption
possibilities.
6.2.2 THROUGH IMPACT ON CREDIT
INSTITUTIONS
a. Direct risks
Direct credit exposures of credit institutions
and securities firms (prime brokers) to hedge
funds are the most obvious channel whereby
hedge funds could affect the robustness of the
financial system. Prime brokers provide
leverage, issue credit lines and have trading
exposures to hedge funds in OTC and other
markets. As credit institutions are key lenders
to hedge funds, one could argue that the
systemic risk posed by hedge funds could be
lowered through prudent risk management. In
addition to credit and trading exposures, other
types of direct exposures include income flow
derived from prime brokerage and other hedge
fund-related services and direct market risk
exposure, as banks invest their own money into
hedge funds as well.
Little information on direct exposures is
available to evaluate the impact of hedge funds
on prime brokers. Publicly available
information provided by prime brokers is very
limited, although improved disclosure by
financial institutions with regard to their
33 According to Deutsche Bank’s 2005 Alternative Investment
Survey, around 80% of FOHFs and banks, consultants,
corporations and insurance companies stated that, for them,
maximum preferred lock-up periods were one year or less.
Family offices/high net worth individuals, pension funds,
endowments and foundations were slightly more willing to
accept longer lock-up periods.36
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dealings with hedge funds was one of the most
important recommendations after the LTCM
crisis.34 Better transparency was and still is
seen as one of the main instruments to make
market discipline effective and for preventing
future systemic disruptions.
A very rough indication of banks’ direct
exposures towards hedge funds can be obtained
by examining Bank for International
Settlements (BIS) data on consolidated bank
claims on private non-bank borrowers in
offshore centres (see Chart 39).35 These
exposures have been growing approximately in
line with the growth of the hedge fund industry.
At the end of 2004, the exposures of EU15
banks to non-banks in offshore centres
constituted half of all reporting banks’
exposures to non-bank borrowers in offshore
financial centres and about 70% of total EU15
banks’ exposures to offshore financial centres.
In addition to the BIS data, certain information
on prime broker exposures to hedge funds can
be obtained from commercial hedge fund
databases that provide information on prime
brokers selected by hedge funds. Table 13 and
Table 14 analyse the market shares and
exposures of the largest prime brokers based on
the TASS database (around two-thirds of hedge
funds provide information on their prime
brokers). These tables give some guidance as to
the magnitude, concentration and risk of
exposures to hedge funds by selected prime
brokers, and could be used by supervisors as a
starting point for the closer examination of
prime brokers’ relations with hedge funds.
Some prime brokers seem to be more
concentrated in a few hedge fund strategies and
may therefore be more vulnerable to
disruptions in certain markets.
The prime brokerage business is itself highly
concentrated. Two firms, Morgan Stanley and
Goldman Sachs, control more than 40% of total
European and global hedge fund clients’
capital under management (see Chart 40). The
estimated global market share of Bear Stearns,
the third largest prime broker, is in excess of
10%, although the firm’s market share appears
to be substantially lower if only European
hedge funds are considered. Other prime
brokers in the European top 10, which includes
two Swiss banks and at least two EU banks,
clearly lag behind the leaders. However, tight
competition in 2004 led to a reduction in the
market shares of the largest prime brokers.
Some of the largest prime brokers, primarily
the US ones, have become very dependent on
the income stream from prime brokerage
services to hedge funds. In some cases, such
income is reported as making up more than a
quarter of their trading and commission income
or an eighth of total revenue. Many banks have
also increased their own trading activities, as
evidenced by the higher VaR numbers reported
recently. The appetite to take on more risk is
probably related to the less volatile market
conditions and the insufficient growth of other
traditional income sources.
Strong competition for hedge fund business
sometimes results in a situation where the prime
brokers have to provide seed capital for a hedge
fund and its management firm in order to establish
a prime brokerage relationship. However, such
investments can also improve the prime broker’s
own profitability via higher returns and lucrative
hedge fund management fees.
Furthermore, there are some signs that tight
competition has an impact on the terms of bank
credit to hedge funds. Credit has become more
available and hedge funds can negotiate better
access to credit, both for their regular business
and for unexpected liquidity shortages. Hedge
funds have also managed to achieve more
favourable collateral terms for their trading
business, as there are indications that banks
more often trade with hedge funds on a variation
margin only, i.e. without requiring an initial
margin. Moreover, established prime brokers
34 US President’s Working Group on Financial Markets (1999).
35 However, this estimation is subject to reservations owing to
the fact that claims on non-banks may comprise substantial
claims on special purpose vehicles and other non-hedge fund
entities domiciled offshore.37
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IMPLICATIONS Chart 38 Volatility of hedge fund, stock and
bond market returns
(%; annualised standard deviation of monthly returns;
January 1994 – December 2004)
Sources: Datastream, Bloomberg and own calculations.
Notes: CSFB/Tremont Index and sub-indices begin in
January 1994, except Multi-Strategy, which began in April
1994, and Investable, which began in January 2000. GBI
EMU $ began in January 1995.
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indicate that there has been some erosion in
credit standards by new entrants to the prime
brokerage business.
However, risk management practices,
particularly the management of counterparty
risk, appear to have improved significantly
since the near-failure of LTCM. Most
financing exposures to hedge funds are
collateralised, and the largest banks make
extensive use of VaR measures and stress tests
to quantify potential future credit exposures
and to protect themselves, particularly their
trading exposures, from an LTCM-type
scenario or other extreme events.
Notwithstanding this the incorporation of asset
illiquidity considerations into various risk
measures remains the near-term challenge for
risk managers. The information flow from most
hedge funds to banks has improved, although
its diversity complicates aggregation for risk
management purposes. Prime brokers seem to
believe that the combination of greater
transparency and collateral enables them to
manage hedge fund-related risks properly.
Nevertheless, there is the risk that in a highly
competitive environment, risk management
standards will be lowered to an inadequate
Chart 39 Consolidated bank claims on private non-banks in offshore financial centres
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Table 13 Concentrations and exposures of selected prime brokers by the number of hedge funds
(number of hedge funds; December 2004)
Selected prime brokers 
(sorted by total capital 
under management of 
hedge funds)
group


































Morgan Stanley 287 245 1 7 19 15 27 59 3 25 31
Bear Stearns 112 75 6 12 11 88 0 853 0 3 5 2 0
Goldman Sachs 230 197 3 19 5 6 40 53 3 21 29
Citigroup 20 5 5 8 21 23 22 8 13
ABN AMRO 48 37 2 1 7 1 18 2   2
Lehman Brothers 30 23 6 1 4 20 5 7 8
Merrill Lynch 18 14 2 2 3 10 4 1 5
Deutsche Bank 31 23 3 2 3 11 21 1 8 12
UBS 69 52 6 6 5 10 15 3 1 11
Banc of America 105 102 2   1   3 10     10
MAN Group 36 5 31 1 1 1
Crédit Agricole 27 1 7 19 2 1 1
CSFB 31 21 3 7 1 14 9 3 2
JPMorgan Chase 7 2 5 1 1
Refco 19 1  1  17   3 3   
Barclays 63 3
SEB 4 3 1
Banque Populaire 3 3 2
HSBC
NCB 1     1   2 2    
KBC 11
A I G 4 2 111 1
Bank of Ireland 3 1 1 1
Société Générale 26 2 1 23 2 2
ING 9 8 15
All selected prime brokers 1,120 817 14 80 69 140 217 340 98 103 139
Others (including 
undisclosed) 414 192 4 51 84 83 69 112 51 21 40
Total number of hedge funds 
in the database 1,534 1,009 18 131 153 223 286 452 149 124 179
Selected EU prime brokers, % 12 8 11 14 7 35 13 8 47 1 1
Selected US prime brokers, % 54 66 67 40 29 26 59 61 52 73 59
CR1 of selected prime 
brokers, % 19 24 33 15 20 14 28 19 20 28 17
CR3 of selected prime 
brokers, % 41 54 61 29 40 33 51 44 47 65 45
Volatility, % 1) - 10.6 17.7 11.6 17.0 12.2 5.8 -3 . 8 4.7 3.0
Sources: TASS database (30 June 2005 version) and own calculations.
Notes: Only funds with reported (estimated) capital under management. If several prime brokers were provided by a hedge fund, then only the first 
indicated prime broker was used.
CR1 – the share (concentration ratio) of the largest prime broker or sub-strategy.
CR3 – the share (concentration ratio) of the three largest prime brokers or sub-strategies. 
1) CSFB/Tremont Hedge Fund Index and sub-indices, annualised standard deviation of monthly returns, January 1994–December 2004.39
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Distribution of leverage Distribution of size
average leverage maximum leverage














leverage 0 ≤ 100 100-200 > 200 0 ≤ 100 100-200 > 200 ≤ $100m
$100m 
- $1bn > $1bn
15 10 398 62 76 30 37 11 16 5 24 12 19 15 64 34 2
16 6 299 27 64 31 22 16 19 11 19 15 16 19 67 29 4
12 6 341 58 78 35 27 11 22 5 18 10 23 13 63 35 2
5 69 41 70 32 22 7 7 32 17 7 7 36 67 29 4
 4 72 51 86 32 31 17 21  22 15 28 36 4 3 51
6 60 38 63 37 20 7 15 22 22 8 52 8 57 42 2
44 39 36 59 15 28 26 18 13 26 5 36 18 59 31 10
13 67 34 69 37 25 16 18 31 9 1 2 1 6 1 5 6 3 3 7
4 98 53 74 28 40 12 15 5 22 12 20 17 801 9 1
64 128 809 2 4 1 2 4 1 3 1 8 31 5 1 4 2 4 5 831 7  
11 554 57 94 17 33 39 6 6 35 30 6 13 72 26 2
5 34 56 91 12 24 50 6 9 18 56 15 56 38 6
43 53 40 70 36 25 8 21 11 21 4 17 23 72 28
3 11 45 91 73 9 18 91 8 55 36 9
14 27 63 89 4 19 41 15 22 19 44 11 22 891 1  
1 7 43 100 29 14 43 14 29 14 29 29 29 71
4 75 100 75 25 25 25 50 75 25
2 7 43 100 43 57 29 29 43 57
11 415 93 100 13 876 0 2 7 6 7 3 3
 4 7 57 100 86 14      14      29 71  
5 6 83 100 17 17 67 17 67 33 67
5 40 802 0 4 0 4 0 2 0 2 0 6 0 802 0
7 10 70 90 60 30 10 30 10 60 40
54 37 62 865 3 8 38 11 8 35 27 14 19 97 3
14 57 100 29 29 36 7 14 43 14 79 21
77 108 1,862 44 63 31 29 15 17 8 21 14 18 16 67 31 2
39 768 1,402 55 74 53 25 10 6 5 19 11 88 68 31 2
116 876 3,264 31 67 40 28 13 12 7 20 13 14 13 67 31 2
8 7 10 24 66 24 33 26 13 4 27 25 13 11 66 32 2
52 5 42 48 68 32 28 13 18 92 0 1 2 1 9 1 7 6 6 3 1 3
14 20 12 -- - - - - - - - - -- - -
37 23 32 -- - - - - - - - - -- - -
4.4 - 8.1 -- - - - - - - - - -- - -40
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Table 14 Concentrations and exposures of selected prime brokers by the capital of hedge funds
 (USD billion; December 2004)
Selected prime brokers 
(sorted by total capital 
under management of 
hedge funds)
group


































Morgan Stanley 50.5 44.4 0.1 0.4 3.6 2.1 4.2 4.7 0.3 2.2 2.3
Bear Stearns 8.8 4.7 0.5 2.3 0.8 0.5 22.5 11.9 4.0 5.6 2.2
Goldman Sachs 29.3 25.8 0.2 2.2 1.0 0.1 7.2 10.8 0.3 6.2 4.3
Citigroup 2.0 0.4 0.8 0.7 0.0 3.2 7.4 7.3 0.0 0.1
ABN AMRO 6.9 6.3 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.1 3.8 0.1    0.1
Lehman Brothers 3.8 3.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 3.8 1.4 2.1 0.4
Merrill Lynch 2.2 1.7 0.4 0.1 1.9 2.5 0.4 0.1 1.9
Deutsche Bank 4.5 3.6 0.0 0.8 0.1 1.1 2.9 0.0 1.4 1.5
UBS 5.5 1.9 1.9 1.4 0.3 1.5 1.3 0.0 0.0 1.3
Banc  of  America 6.5 6.5 0.0  0.0  0.1 0.4     0.4
MAN Group 3.9 0.3 3.5 0.7 0.0 0.0
Crédit Agricole 4.0 0.1 0.5 3.4 0.3 0.3 0.0
CSFB 2.0 1.3 0.4 0.3 0.0 1.1 0.8 0.2 0.1
JPMorgan Chase 0.7 0.1 0.6 1.8 1.8
Refco 2.1 0.0  0.0   2.1   0.1 0.1    
Barclays 1.5 1.2 0.3
SEB 1.9 1.3 0.7
Banque Populaire 0.5 0.5 0.7
HSBC
NCB 0.2      0.2    0.2 0.2    
KBC 0.2 0.2
AIG 1.2 0.1 0.0 1.1 0.1 0.1
Bank of Ireland 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.0
Société Générale 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.1 0.1
ING 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.5
All selected prime brokers 138.3 102.5 0.8 10.3 9.5 15.2 47.6 51.1 18.3 17.8 15.0
Others (including 
undisclosed) 47.6 21.0 0.1 7.5 13.3 5.7 12.7 22.6 14.0 4.1 4.5
Total capital of hedge funds 
in the database1 85.9 123.5 0.9 17.8 22.8 20.9 60.3 73.7 32.4 21.9 19.5
Selected EU prime brokers, % 13 10 2 9 7 38 11 7 5 6 10
Selected US prime brokers, % 58 70 89 3 62 73 36 55 94 8 74 59
CR1 of selected prime 
brokers, % 27 36 54 13 26 17 37 16 22 28 22
CR3 of selected prime 
brokers, % 49 62 843 6 4 8 43 56 41 44 64 45
Volatility, % 1) - 10.6 17.7 11.6 17.0 12.2 5.8 -3 . 8 4.7 3.0
Sources: TASS database (30 June 2005 version) and own calculations.
Notes: Only funds with reported (estimated) capital under management. If several prime brokers were provided by a hedge fund, then only the first 
indicated prime broker was used.
CR1 – the share (concentration ratio) of the largest prime broker or sub-strategy.
CR3 – the share (concentration ratio) of the three largest prime brokers or sub-strategies. 
1) CSFB/Tremont Hedge Fund Index and sub-indices, annualised standard deviation of monthly returns, January 1994–December 2004.41
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Distribution of leverage Distribution of size
average leverage maximum leverage














leverage 0 ≤ 100 100-200 > 200 0 ≤ 100 100-200 > 200 ≤ $100m
$100m 
- $1bn > $1bn
5.3 0.8 65.5 688 22 2 4 9 1 2 1 16 3 1 1 8 18 12 13 69 18
7.0 2.2 52.4 43 67 31 29 11 13 16 26 12 10 21 13 49 38
2.5 1.5 51.3 50 76 35 25 10 23 8 17 6 23 19 13 73 14
0.1 12.7 57 89 30 14 3 6 47 9 4 3 54 12 56 32
 0.3 11.1 57 96 18 39 14 30  25 18 34 4 15 74 11
1.4 9.2 36 73 53 7 5 17 17 12 5 2 288 8 11 1
2.3 0.3 9.2 26 66 21 38 61 7 1 8 9 2 26 42 9 31 60
0.2 0.4 9.0 40 72 36 20 12 26 6 22 5 9 28 15 85
0.4 8.8 22 60 33 28 4 8 28 23 2 9 34 21 59 20
0.3 0.1 7.4 879 6 3 2 3 9 8 20 2 15 26 18 94 0 6 0 
0.0 2.3 6.9 51 95 20 37 27 8 74 8 22 2 9 12 60 28
2.0 6.3 53 93 28 34 16 8 13 36 13 22 9 56 35
0.4 0.1 3.6 36 69 29 31 7 16 17 34 0 10 26 27 73
1.0 3.4 51 97 35 13 52 13 52 4 45 51
0.0 0.3 2.5 869 9 0 1 825 1 2 7 805 8 30 70  
0.9 2.4 52 100 46 6 45 3 46 6 42 6 6 94
1.9 66 100 66 34 6 5 88 45 55
0.5 1.7 40 100 63 37 32 5 7 93
0.0 1.6 1.6 100 100 46 54 40 14 12 88
 1.1 1.5 75 100 861 4      1 4       7 9 3  
1.1 1.2 86 100 14 39 47 39 47 5 95
1.2 88 97 4 4 92 4 1 95 12 88
0.8 1.2 69 99 56 34 10 34 10 22 78
0.0 0.1 1.2 78 9 7 1 5 43 1 9 5 5 32 4 8 14 62 38
0.9 60 100 29 29 37 5 23 39 9 52 48
20.7 16.6 274.3 37 62 29 33 11 15 12 24 12 15 21 14 64 22
7.0 99.1 189.0 52 71 52 27 9 6 7 21 10 7 10 15 68 17
27.6 115.7 463.3 27 65 38 30 10 11 10 23 11 11 16 15 66 20
4 8 10 27 65 25 36 15 19 4 32 14 13 16 14 72 14
68 5 46 40 68 29 32 10 14 13 22 12 15 21 14 62 24
25 25 14 -- - - - - - - - - -- - -
53 29 37 -- - - - - - - - - -- - -
4.4 - 8.1 -- - - - - - - - - -- - -42
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level. Since the prime brokerage business is
quite concentrated, it should be relatively
easier for supervisors to monitor their activities
and to detect any substantial erosion of risk
management standards.
Hedge funds, particularly the larger ones,
prefer to use more than one prime broker to
diversify counterparty base, ensure pricing
efficiency and protect their proprietary trading
strategies (see Chart 41). The rapidly evolving
hedge fund needs, portfolio-level margining
and incentives provided by prime brokers can
nevertheless induce them to rely on the services
of just one prime broker. However, most of the
time credit providers do not have a full picture
on a daily basis of the positions and risks faced
by a hedge fund as a whole. This might also
support the calling for more active information
exchange among regulatory authorities, in
addition to the gathering of more focused
information from local prime brokers.
Prime brokers have been increasingly setting
up in-house hedge funds in order to retain
employees and to satisfy investor demand.
Quite often, former employees choose their
former bank as a prime broker, which could
affect the risk management standards applied.
Reputation and legal risks may also arise
because of dealing with unregulated and
opaque entities or customers complaining
about losses on investments in hedge funds
commercialised by the bank.
b. Indirect risks
Apart from direct risks, credit institutions and
securities firms face a number of indirect risks
stemming from hedge fund activities. Indirect
credit risk may arise because of credit risk vis-
à-vis counterparties with large exposures on
hedge funds. To materialise, such indirect risk
does not necessarily require the default of a
financial institution, as even payment problems
involving a major prime broker could affect the
stability of the global financial system.
Moreover, the value of market positions in
prime broker portfolios may be adversely
affected by hedge fund actions in financial
markets, as the next sub-section discusses.
Indeed, dislocations in financial markets could
Chart 40 European1) hedge fund prime brokers by hedge fund capital under management
(% market shares; January 2004) (% market shares; January 2005)
Sources: EuroHedge (2004) and International Financial Services, London (2005) (obtained from EuroHedge).
1) As defined by EuroHedge; does not include managed futures funds.



















































be an important indirect threat, as witnessed by
the events around the time of the near-default
of LTCM.
Finally, prime brokers may lose income from
their own asset management business if hedge
funds continue to expand. However, banks
seem to be taking the threat of hedge funds
seriously and are ready to adjust their business
strategies accordingly.
6.2.3 THROUGH IMPACT ON FINANCIAL
MARKETS
Hedge funds adopt active, opportunistic and
sometimes leveraged trading strategies. They
turn their portfolios over far more frequently
than traditional funds, so their short-term
influence on markets can be larger than the
actual capital under management would
indicate. Hedge funds generally prefer liquid
and “anonymous” markets, which can be
entered and exited swiftly at low cost. Their
actions tend to be sporadic and, in contrast to
traditional funds, they do not need to be fully
invested all the time.
The impact of hedge funds on financial markets
has been long debated, and efforts to estimate
the impact are hampered by the lack of data
Chart 41 Average number of prime brokers
used by hedge funds
(end-2001)
Source: International Financial Services, London (2004)
(obtained from Global Custodian).
with sufficient quality. Nevertheless, the
descriptions of various past episodes where
hedge funds were reportedly involved can be
found in a number of reports by international
organisations. Most of them relate to macro
hedge funds, which try to exploit doubts about
the sustainability of unsound macroeconomic
policies, or probe shaky currency pegs. In some
cases, there were suspicions that hedge funds
had compromised market integrity by allegedly
engaging in manipulation, collusion or other
possibly unfair trading practices. However, it
is very difficult to draw the line between
seemingly manipulative trades and rational
economic behaviour. For example, the
Financial Stability Forum (FSF) in its report on
highly leveraged institutions36 declined to
conclude that hedge funds had compromised
market integrity in episodes it analysed,
because their true motives were unknown and
very difficult to prove. Moreover, quite often it
were international or domestic large financial
institutions and domestic investors, and not
hedge funds, which led or precipitated market
crashes.
Under normal conditions, hedge funds
contribute to the liquidity and efficient
functioning of financial markets. However, in
certain cases, especially in small or medium-
sized markets, their actions can be
destabilising. Policymakers should therefore
aim at widening the investor base of their
markets, as this diminishes the risk of abrupt
developments prompted by high speculative
activity or the mass exit of short-term
investors, such as hedge funds. Against
this background, the fact that the BIS
has started publishing Hirschman-Herfindahl
concentration indices for a number of OTC
markets represents a welcome development.
Information on concentration in these and other
somewhat opaque markets can provide an early
warning signal regarding the build-up of
concentrated positions in certain markets, and

















$100-500m > $500m Total
36 Financial Stability Forum (2000).44
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% of number indicated using % of capital indicated using
particular investment approach particular investment approach
Number Trend Capital, Trend
Strategy of funds Contrarian follower Fundamental USD billion Contrarian follower Fundamental
Directional 1,534 10 13 56 185.9 6 10 63
Long/Short Equity Hedge 1,009 11 3 66 123.5 7 2 71
Dedicated Short Bias 18 6 ... 33 0.9 ... ... 71
Global Macro 131 8 21 51 17.8 8 21 73
Emerging Markets 153 5 1 52 22.8 2 ... 52
Managed Futures 223 10 61 14 20.9 4 62 17
Event Driven 286 15 1 49 60.3 11 ... 46
Market Neutral 452 4 1 35 73.7 2 ... 32
Fixed Income Arbitrage 149 1 1 39 32.4 1 ... 34
Convertible Arbitrage 124 5 ... 24 21.9 3 ... 22
Equity Market Neutral 179 4 1 40 19.5 2 ... 38
Other 116 3 8 35 27.6 13 2 44
Fund of Funds 876 16 19 41 115.7 12 19 42
Total (excluding FOHFs) 2,388 9 9 50 347.6 7 6 52
Total 3,264 11 11 48 463.3 8 9 49
Table 15 Share of hedge funds using selected investment approaches
(December 2004)
Source: TASS database (30 June 2005 version).
Note: Only funds with reported (estimated) capital under management.
After a prolonged period of hedge fund
underperformance, the risk of a sharp reversal
in inflows cannot be discounted. The investor
base is probably sufficiently diverse in
developed markets, and a reversal of inflows
into hedge funds, given their still relatively
moderate size, should not have major
implications. However, in smaller or less liquid
markets, such a scenario could cause temporary
liquidity strains, particularly if reversals would
occur over a short period.
There are indications that certain strategies
(e.g. convertible arbitrage) have reached
capacity limits related to market size. If this is
indeed the case for most older strategies, then
only funds with new ideas or ones dealing in
fledgling sophisticated markets can continue to
deliver alpha.37 According to market reports,
the capacity limits of certain strategies or
markets has made large and liquid foreign
exchange markets attractive to hedge funds
once again.
a. Do hedge funds create volatility?
One question that often arises is whether hedge
funds – through their daily activity – stabilise
or destabilise financial markets. In this
context, two forms of trading can be
distinguished: positive and negative feedback
trading. The former refers to the buying of
financial instruments after price increases and
selling after price decreases. This practice can
amplify price swings and lead to overshooting
or bubbles. Positive feedback or momentum
trading can be generated by dynamic hedging,
stop-loss orders, similar position-taking by
other market participants, forced liquidations
related to margin calls or just by simple trend-
following strategies. By contrast, negative
feedback or contrarian trading can have a
stabilising influence on markets.
Intuitively, hedge funds should be more
contrarian, as only trading against the crowd
can be expected to generate persistent excess
profits. However, markets are not completely
efficient and trend-following can, at times, be
37 Alpha is the return associated with active asset management.
It is also referred to as non-systematic risk or specific risk,
as opposed to the systemic or overall market risk “beta”,
which broadly denotes volatility and returns associated with
general or market-wide risks (and is also a measure of the
volatility relative to the overall market).45
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lucrative. Managed futures hedge funds (5% of
the total single hedge fund capital under
management, see Chart 20) are reportedly cited
as utilising trend-following approaches (see
Table 15). However, researchers from the US
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC), using micro trading data, have found
that managed futures hedge funds can dampen
rather than increase volatility in energy
markets by providing liquidity to other market
participants.38 Other directional strategies –
global macro (10%)39, emerging markets (4%),
long/short equity (32%) – can be on both sides
of the spectrum, while dedicated short-sellers
(less than 1%) are probably more contrarians.
According to TASS data, global macro funds
also seem to employ rather extensively trend-
following approaches, but at the same time they
rely more on fundamental analysis. Event
driven (19%) and market neutral (19%)
strategies probably also involve the taking of
more contrarian views. Hence, it is very
difficult to determine whether hedge funds, on
average, are momentum traders or contrarians.
b. Do hedge funds benefit from volatility?
Conventional wisdom suggests that hedge
funds thrive in volatile financial markets. This
is frequently put forward as a reason for the
diminishing returns that were observed in the
rather low stock market volatility environment
in the second quarter of 2004. However, there is
no conclusive evidence on this issue. Indeed,
contrary to popular belief, calculations
indicate that over the past 11 years hedge
funds, on average, tended to perform better
when stock markets were less volatile (see
Chart 42 and Chart 43).
The correlation coefficients between the
annualised S&P 500, Dow Jones EURO
STOXX historical monthly volatility and the
CSFB/Tremont Hedge Fund Index monthly
returns were negative.40 In other words, higher
volatility was associated with lower hedge
fund returns. The results are similar across
almost all hedge fund strategies. Only
dedicated short-sellers and managed futures
funds, which together account for only around
5% of total capital under management, tend to
perform better in volatile markets. Thus,
although short-sellers are more likely to be
contrarians, their returns tend to be higher in
volatile markets, as volatility is usually higher
in falling rather than rising markets. These
results suggest that many hedge funds could
actually be short in volatility owing to the
nature of their strategies.
Another plausible explanation as to why lower
volatility could benefit hedge fund performance
is related to the impact of leverage. For example,
a price decrease of 5% on a five times leveraged
investment portfolio means a 25% loss for
capital under management. Hence, larger price
declines may force hedge funds to unwind losing
leveraged positions more often due to internal
risk limits or margin calls from prime brokers. In
addition, by selling into a falling market, hedge
funds may also further exacerbate volatility,
especially if the relative size of their positions or
activity is significant for the affected markets.
The lower the available liquidity buffers are and
the higher the use of leverage is, the more often
hedge funds will be forced to liquidate
positions.41 However, hedge funds probably do
not use all available leveraging possibilities and
have some capital cushion in times of stress. In
the TASS database, about one-third of single
hedge funds provide information on average and
maximum leverage (as specified in offering
documents or voluntarily set by managers).42 Of
those, about 10% have a ratio of average to
maximum leverage in excess of 0.9.
38 Haigh et al. (2005).
39 For example, Tiger Fund, a prominent global macro hedge
fund, was betting against the technology bubble, but its
capital was depleted and investors withdrew before the
bubble actually burst.
40 In both cases pairwise correlation coefficients are
statistically significant (i.e. different from zero) at a 99%
confidence level (132 observation pairs).
41 See the discussion about the implications of hedge fund
leverage on credit markets by Fitch Ratings (2005).
42 Including only cases where the provided average or
maximum leverage is not zero and average leverage is not
higher than maximum leverage.46
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Chart 43 Hedge fund returns and DJ EURO STOXX volatility
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Sources: Datastream and Bloomberg.
c. The issue of “crowded trades”
As an increasing number of funds attempt to
exploit profitable opportunities from similar
strategies, concerns have been raised that the
positioning of individual hedge funds is
Chart 42 Hedge fund returns and S&P 500 volatility
(%; in USD; January 1994-December 2004; monthly data)
Sources: Datastream and Bloomberg.
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becoming more similar or “crowded”.
Moreover, the growth of the industry could also
be leading to diminishing returns and could, as
a result, push funds into greater risk-taking,
through increased leverage. This sub-section47
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examines the issue of the risk that crowded
trades could result in adverse market dynamics
by analysing recent hedge fund return
performances from a historical perspective.
When markets are stable, the presence of hedge
funds can boost liquidity, whereas under stressed
conditions hedge funds – because they are
unlikely or simply cannot afford to wait when
leveraged positions begin to lose money – would
probably be among the first to “rush for the exit”.
The crowding of trades or similar positioning
across hedge funds within a particular strategy
may further magnify the impact of hedge fund
exits on certain fledgling or “exotic” markets
where the involvement of regulated institutional
investors is less prevalent.43
Since 2001, hedge fund returns have become
less widely dispersed (see Chart 44), which
could be a broad indication that hedge fund
positioning is becoming increasingly similar,
although it might also be related to the
relatively more benign market environment or
to lower risk-taking by hedge funds. One way
of disentangling this is to consider patterns in
pairwise correlation coefficients of individual
hedge fund return performance within
strategies. Rising correlations could be a sign
that hedge fund managers are employing
models that are too similar and are no longer
creating true alpha – or excess returns – that are
uncorrelated with other managers within the
same strategy, even though they may still
outperform other types of investments. If
correlations are high, hedge funds within a
strategy may be more likely to liquidate
positions simultaneously in the event of a
serious market shock, thus amplifying price
swings or even causing liquidity to dry up.
Higher correlations also imply reduced
diversification possibilities for funds of hedge
funds specialising in a particular strategy.
The median pairwise correlation coefficients
of hedge fund monthly returns within each
strategy for the 11 years between December
1993 and December 2004 are generally not very
43 The positions of investment banks also matter as their
proprietary trading desks sometimes use similar strategies or
enter into “copycat” trades, based on the assumption that
hedge funds have superior market knowledge.
Chart 44 Dispersion of hedge fund monthly
returns
(%, net of all fees; in USD terms;
December 1993-December 2004; monthly data)





    
    
















Chart 45 Distribution of pairwise
correlation coefficients of monthly hedge
fund returns within each strategy
Sources: TASS database (24 March 2005 version) and own
calculations.
Notes: For the last 12 months to December 2004, only hedge
funds with 12 observations were included, whereas for the
period from December 1993 to December 2004, no less than
12 consecutive overlapping observations were necessary for
each pair of hedge funds. Pearson median skewness.
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Chart 46 Medians of pairwise correlation
coefficients of monthly hedge fund returns
within strategies
(moving 12-month window; December 1994–December 2004;
monthly data)
Sources: TASS database (24 March 2005 version), TASS
Research and own calculations.
Notes: Circled points refer to August 1998. For each 12-
month moving window, only hedge funds with 12 monthly
observations were included. Numbers in parentheses after
strategy names indicate the share of total capital under
management (excluding FOHFs) at the end of December
2004, as reported by TASS Research.
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Dedicated Short Bias (0%)
Managed Futures (5%)
Long/Short Equity Hedge (32%)
high (see the left panel of  Chart 45).44 After
taking into account slightly different
classifications of strategies, the values roughly
correspond to those obtained by the FSF in
2000 from the MAR/Hedge database for the
period from January 1990 to August 1999.45
According to both calculations, short-sellers
and funds of funds were the two categories with
the highest medians. Based on the more recent
11-year TASS sample, two market neutral
strategies, namely fixed income arbitrage and
equity market neutral, had the lowest pairwise
correlation coefficients, whereas the
convertible arbitrage strategy ranked third,
ahead of event driven and other directional
strategies.
However, these results cover rather long
periods, while the medians of pairwise
correlation coefficients of returns over the 12
months to December 2004 convey a more
worrying picture (see the middle and right-
hand panels of Chart 45).46 Across all
strategies, medians were substantially higher
and the distributions of pairwise correlation
coefficients were more negatively skewed than
their long-term values. For many strategies the
proportions of pairwise correlation
coefficients close to or less than zero were
substantial. This suggests that in 2004 there
were still hedge funds with returns that were
uncorrelated to other hedge funds within the
same strategy, assuming funds were (self-)
classified correctly and that there was no style
drift.
In normal times, similar actions by hedge funds
may lead to varied performances, even if hedge
44 In the TASS database, some time series of hedge fund returns
represent merely counterpart onshore and offshore funds or
different classes of shares with different fee structures, lock-
up periods and other “technical” differences. As a result,
such time series basically correspond to the parts of the same
pool of money, which are managed in a highly correlated or
nearly identical way. Therefore, to ensure conservative
results, such time series were aggregated by taking averages
of returns weighted by capital under management.
45 Financial Stability Forum (2000), p. 89 and p. 104.
46 Given 12 observation pairs and a 5% (1%) confidence level,
statistically significant (i.e. different from zero) module
values of pairwise correlation coefficients should exceed
0.58 (0.71).ECB






fund investment strategies, positions and
expectations within strategies might be very
alike. This is likely to be the case because of a
sufficient diversity in micro factors, such as
portfolio structure, liquidity profile, internal
risk limits or timing. However, under stressed
conditions, these differences tend to disappear,
especially if trades are leveraged, and the
ability of hedge funds to take offsetting
contrarian positions is limited.
In times of stress, if trades are crowded, the
correlations of return performances can surge.
This occurred in August and September 1998
after the Russian default and the near-collapse
of LTCM (see Chart 46). Putting the recent rise
of correlations into this historical context, the
behaviour of median pairwise correlation
coefficients within funds of funds, event-
driven, convertible arbitrage and managed
futures strategies in a relatively benign market
environment raises concerns. The medians of
convertible arbitrage, fixed income arbitrage,
event-driven and managed futures strategies
have also exhibited long-term rising trends.
All in all, there are indications that hedge fund
positioning has resulted in a crowding of trades
in some markets, possibly leaving them
vulnerable to adverse market dynamics. These
concerns are the greatest for convertible
arbitrage and credit strategies, where close
monitoring is called for, especially as these
strategies generally have the highest leverage
and therefore significant gross positions. The
unwinding of these positions could prove
disruptive for the fixed income markets in
which these funds are involved, especially if
the degree of liquidity in these markets was to
prove low. 47
7 REGULATORY AND SUPERVISORY
IMPLICATIONS
7.1 RISK MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
Since the near-default of LTCM, several public
and private initiatives have been launched to
47 A breakdown is not available, but a subset of hedge funds in
the event driven strategy specialise in distressed/high yield
debt, which is also rather illiquid.
48 See, for example, the Managed Funds Association (2005) and
Alternative Investment Management Association (2002).
49 In addition, IOSCO took several initiatives; see for example
International Organization of Securities Commissions
(1999).
50 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1999b).
address some of the concerns raised by hedge
funds. Annex B provides a selected overview of
such initiatives, some of which are aimed at
improving risk management practices at the
counterparties of hedge funds. The underlying
rationale of this approach is that such indirect
regulation is probably more effective than the
direct regulation of hedge funds, which can
move their domicile quite easily from one
country to another and therefore can easily
engage in regulatory arbitrage. In addition, the
hedge fund industry itself has taken several
initiatives to develop (non-legally binding)
sound practices with the aim of enhancing
investor protection and market soundness.48
The work of the BCBS49 is the most prominent
of the public sector initiatives. In 1999, the
BCBS issued a list of sound practices for
banks’ interactions with “highly leveraged
institutions” (HLIs).50 These practices were
designed to address some of the major risk
management failures that emerged from the
LTCM episode, i.e. over-reliance on the
collateralisation of mark-to-market exposures,
and the insufficient weight placed on the
in-depth credit analyses of HLIs. The sound
practices specifically addressed areas such as
policies and procedures for banks’ interaction
with HLIs, information gathering and credit
analysis of HLIs, exposure measures and the
monitoring of such exposures, credit limits,
and the link between credit enhancement tools
(such as collateral) and the specific
characteristics of HLIs.
In a follow-up report, the BCBS concluded that
although banks had improved their risk
management practices, there were still a
number of areas that required sustained
attention, most notably the due diligence50
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process for establishing credit relations with
HLIs, the development of improved exposure
measures, and the use of stress-testing.51 These
conclusions were basically confirmed in a joint
report published by the BCBS and IOSCO a
year later.52
Significant private sector initiatives include
those of the Counterparty Risk Management
Policy Group (CRMPG), the International
Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA)
and the Institute of International Finance (IIF).
The CRMPG or “Corrigan group” is a group of
12 major, internationally active banks and
securities firms that have developed standards
for strengthened risk management practices for
financial firms that provide credit in the
derivatives and securities markets.53 These
improved standards are based on the following
broad principles: (i) enhanced information-
sharing between counterparties, (ii) an
integrated framework to assess market risk,
liquidity risk and leverage, (iii) stress-testing
and liquidation-based estimates of
counterparty credit exposures, (iv) the need to
take into account potential liquidation costs in
setting limits and collateral standards, (v)
enhancements in the quality of information,
and (vi) improvements in the standards of
industry documentation. The CRMPG recently
published a review of its guidance, taking into
account the financial, regulatory and
supervisory developments that have occurred
since 1999. The Group also investigated in
detail complex financial products, including
hedge funds, and their implications for risk
management.54
Following up on the market events of the
1990s, the ISDA reviewed its collateral
management practices, which led to 22
recommendations for enhancements.55 The
recommendations cover areas such as: (i) the
relationship between collateralisation and
credit analysis, (ii) the management of risks
related to collateralisation, (iii) dispute
resolution, (iv) the length of the collateral
cycle, (v) the range of collateral accepted, (vi)
margining, (vii) legal and documentation
issues, (viii) cross-product netting, and (ix)
substitution of collateral. Finally, the IIF, a
global association of financial institutions,
also published in 1999 a number of
recommendations in the area of risk
management.56
7.2 DISCLOSURE, TRANSPARENCY AND THE
VALUATION OF POSITIONS
The international supervisory and central
banking community has become increasingly
convinced that market discipline can play an
important role in maintaining financial
stability. A precondition for market discipline
to be effective is adequate public disclosure
about the risks that financial intermediaries can
incur. Following the market events of the
1990s, several international initiatives were
launched to improve disclosure by regulated as
well as unregulated (such as hedge funds)
intermediaries.
The so-called “Fisher II” working group57
(2001) recommended that financial
intermediaries, including hedge funds, should
periodically disclose, when risks are material,
quantitative information related to market risk
in trading activity, firm-wide exposure to
market risk, funding liquidity risk, credit risk
and insurance risk. To the extent that not all
hedge funds disclose this information on a
voluntary basis, the group recommended that
the relevant authorities should consider
requiring this disclosure. The group also
concluded that the indicated information
should be considered to be a minimum of what
would be expected in bilateral disclosures to
51 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2000).
52 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the
International Organization of Securities Commissions
(2001).
53 Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group (1999).
54 Counterparty Risk Management Group (2005).
55 International Swaps and Derivatives Association (1999).
56 Institute of International Finance (1999).
57 Multidisciplinary Working Group on Enhanced Disclosure
(2001). This Working Group was jointly sponsored by the
BCBS, the Committee on the Global Financial System
(CGFS), the International Association of Insurance
Supervisors (IAIS) and IOSCO.ECB






judge the adequacy of regulated firms’ risk
management capabilities.
As a follow-up to the recommendations, the
Joint Forum58 established a working group to
assess the extent to which the
recommendations had been adopted.59
However, regarding hedge funds, the working
group was unable to obtain the necessary
information to provide a meaningful basis for
further review. This was attributed to possible
concerns about client confidentiality, the
proprietary nature of the funds’ positions, and a
general reluctance to engage in a dialogue with
the regulatory community. The working group
did not draw any conclusions from these
findings regarding the regulation of hedge
funds.
Inadequate disclosure and transparency are to a
very large extent rooted in the largely
unregulated nature of hedge funds. Moreover,
problems related to the valuation of positions
are often the direct cause of hedge fund
failures.60 Apart from the limited regulatory
and auditing standards that apply to hedge
funds, other factors that explain this type of
operational risk are the investment strategies
pursued by the funds (positions for which there
might be no readily available market prices),
the small size of the hedge fund enterprise
(with less scope for rigorous segregation of
functions), and performance-related fees
(which create an incentive for managers to
misrepresent asset values). Another
complicating factor with regard to enhancing
disclosure for hedge funds is that no generally
accepted market standard has yet emerged that
can adequately measure leverage61, which is
crucial in assessing the level of risk faced by a
hedge fund.
The effect of strong institutional demand for
hedge funds on transparency is ambiguous. On
the one hand, it reduces incentives for hedge
funds to be more transparent, yet, on the other
hand, hedge funds are forced to disclose more
information in order to attract funds. The
outcome ultimately depends on the relative
negotiating strength of the two parties
involved. There are some indications that, over
the last years, transparency has improved for
direct investors and prime brokers, but not for
other market participants. Some authors are
also sceptical about the positive financial
stability effects of enhanced disclosure,
stressing that it might negatively impact on the
liquidity of financial markets.62
7.3 SOUND BUSINESS PRACTICES
With the growth in the hedge fund business, the
number of hedge fund-related fraud cases has
also increased. As discussed in the previous
sub-section, the largely unregulated nature of
the business makes it particularly vulnerable to
misrepresentation and fraud. In its recent
proposed rule regarding the registration of
certain hedge fund advisors, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) estimated that in
the past five years it had acted against hedge
fund fraud totalling more than USD 1 billion.
The SEC’s cases included the gross
overstatement of hedge fund performance, the
payment of unnecessary and undisclosed
commissions, and the misappropriation of
client assets by hedge funds. Advisers to hedge
funds were also key participants in the recent
scandals involving mutual fund late trading and
inappropriate market timing.63 Since the
management of hedge funds is very
international in nature, it has been argued that
the hedge fund business is particularly
vulnerable to money laundering attempts.
Hedge fund managers should therefore duly
verify, directly or indirectly (e.g. through the
fund’s administrators), the identity of the
investors in their funds.
58 The Joint Forum is an international group of technical
experts working under the umbrella of the BCBS, the IAIS
and IOSCO.
59 Joint Forum (2004).
60 See for example, Kundro and Feffer (2004).
61 Multidisciplinary Working Group on Enhanced Disclosure
(2001). This was one of the areas which the working group
identified where the industry could do further work.
62 Persaud (2001).
63 Securities and Exchange Commission (2004).52
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7.4 REGULATORY ISSUES
In the United States, the SEC ruled at the end of
2004 that most hedge fund advisors (i.e.
managers) must register with the SEC and
comply with the regulations that apply to other
registered investment advisors. This
requirement was introduced by changing the
rule that an investment advisor was exempted
from registration if, among other things, he or
she advised no more than 14 clients. Under the
new rules, an advisor to a private (hedge) fund
is no longer permitted to count the fund, rather
than its owners, as a single client (the “look
through” approach). The registration implies
the need to keep written records, and that there
will be heightened scrutiny of conflicts of
interest and their disclosure, plus the
possibility of SEC inspections, etc. Advisors
should register before 1 February 2006. The
rule followed an extensive investigation by the
SEC into the implications of the growth of
hedge funds. This investigation identified a
number of concerns, including a lack of
information regarding unregistered advisors,
which made it difficult to uncover fraud, and
the way in which advisors value hedge fund
assets.64 The decision was by no means
uncontroversial – indeed, the SEC
commissioners were themselves divided on the
issue65, and a number of industry groupings
have already indicated that they plan to
challenge the SEC decision before the courts.66
At present, there is no common regulatory
regime in the EU for hedge funds or their
managers.67 At the same time, it should be
recalled that, on a global basis, the great
majority of hedge funds continue to be
managed by US managers, although the
importance of managers located in the EU is
steadily increasing (see Chart 5 and Chart 7).
Because of their investment strategies, hedge
funds typically fall outside the scope of the
UCITS Directives.68 One implication of this is
that they do not benefit from having a
“European passport”, which prevents their
marketing across the EU. Their EU investment
managers, by contrast, are already subject to
the Financial Instruments and Markets
Directive69, which recently replaced the
Investment Services Directive.70 Hence, hedge
funds in the EU are often set up where they are
distributed, although there is an increasing use
of pan-European domiciles.
In January 2004, the European Parliament
adopted a resolution on hedge funds based on a
report by its Economic and Monetary Affairs
Committee (EMAC).71 In this resolution, the
Parliament proposed to introduce a light
regulatory regime for “sophisticated
alternative investment vehicles”, which
include hedge funds. The purpose of this
proposal would be to bring onshore funds that
are presently offshore and to provide them with
the benefit of a European passport. The
industry was also invited to develop a self-
regulatory code of conduct.
Following the near-completion of the Financial
Services Action Plan (FSAP), the European
Commission set up four expert groups of
market practitioners to assess the state of
integration of European financial markets. In
its May 2004 report, the asset management
expert group recommended inter alia that the
Commission should review the EU regulatory
framework to allow currently non-harmonised
products, such as hedge funds, to be brought to
the market on an EU-wide basis, subject to
appropriate safeguards. Current UCITS
legislation could be used as a reference for this
regulation, but adapted to the specific nature of
the products.
For the time being, the European Commission
and the Council have not yet taken up the
64 Securities and Exchange Commission (2003).
65 See Atkins (2004) for some of the arguments against the
ruling.
66 Avery (2005), Maiden (2004).
67 An overview of the regulation of hedge funds in Europe can
be found in PricewaterhouseCoopers (2003 and 2004b).
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Parliament’s proposal and the
recommendations of the asset management
group. In its recently released Green Paper for
financial services policy in the next five
years72, the Commission did not signal any
particular initiatives planned in the area of
hedge funds. This was confirmed in the Green
Paper on asset management73 published a few
months later in which it was stated that there
was currently no compelling evidence for EU
legislation. Nevertheless, the Commission
confirmed that some issues deserved further
attention, including the growing access to
retail investors, the exposures of investment
banks and the impact on financial markets. In
that respect, it invited responses from the
public to these issues and also announced the
creation of an industry working group on
alternative investment strategies.
The domestic regulation of hedge funds takes
place at three levels: (i) the fund manager, (ii)
the fund itself, and (iii) the distribution of the
fund. Table 16  provides a brief overview of the
situation in a selected number of European
countries for a number of key elements for each
of these three levels.
In most European countries, traditional fund
managers are also allowed to manage
domestically and/or offshore domiciled hedge
funds. For example, in the United Kingdom the
FSA applies a regulatory regime to hedge fund
managers that is similar to the one that applies
to other investment managers. Following an
industry consultation that took place last year,
the FSA has confirmed that it has no intention
of introducing a special regime to regulate
hedge fund managers, since the present regime
was generally deemed to be appropriate.74 This
position is particularly relevant for the EU
hedge fund industry, since the majority of EU
hedge funds are managed from London. More
recently, however, hedge fund managers have
also started to emerge in countries such as
France, Ireland, Italy and Sweden.
Most hedge funds are domiciled offshore
because of the prevailing lighter regulatory
regime and for tax reasons.75 However, some
European jurisdictions, such as France,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and Sweden, have
also tried to attract hedge fund business by
providing a flexible regime. Ireland is
particularly attractive as a domicile for EU
hedge funds, where they are often listed on the
stock exchange. Similarly, Luxembourg has
taken a number of measures to attract the hedge
fund business and is increasingly seen as an
alternative to Ireland. Reasons behind
choosing a European location in spite of the
advantages offered by going offshore might be
to target investors that have a preference for EU
funds or that are legally restricted to investing
outside the EU. European locations might also
benefit from the international initiatives
against some offshore financial centres that are
accused of engaging in harmful tax competition
or that are deemed not to comply with the
international standards to prevent money
laundering.76
Finally, with regard to the distribution of hedge
funds, they are traditionally targeted at high net
worth individuals or institutional investors so
that they do not fall under the protection regime
in place for retail investors. Sometimes, retail
investors have gained indirect access to hedge
funds via so-called wrappers, which are
financial products (such as structured notes,
unit-linked insurance policies) whose
performance is linked to that of an underlying
hedge fund or a portfolio of hedge funds.
There is a trend towards the “retailisation” of
hedge funds, and several European countries
have recently permitted the distribution of
hedge funds to retail investors, even though,
compared to the traditional funds industry,
retail investments in (funds of) hedge funds are
72 European Commission (2005a).
73 European Commission (2005b)
74 UK’s Financial Services Authority (2003).
75 Popular European offshore centres for hedge funds are
Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man.
76 See in this respect, for example, the different initiatives
launched by the FSF, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) and the Financial Action
Task Force (FATF).54
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still very small. Allowing hedge fund products
to be distributed to retail investors raises
specific investor protection concerns, such as
inadequate disclosure, the risk of mis-buying
and mis-selling, the lack of sufficient
diversification, disproportionate management
costs, etc.77 Some of these concerns can be
addressed by only allowing certain variants of
hedge funds to be commercialised, such as
FOHFs or funds with capital protection.
Existence of domestic
Hedge fund managers domiciled hedge funds Distribution of hedge funds
FOHFs
available
Regulator Minimum capital requirement Single fund? FOHF? Main channel to public?
AT FMA Varies Banks, wrappers, fund
distribution companies Yes
BE Not regulated Not regulated Banks, private placements,
wrappers
DE Not regulated Not regulated Yes Yes Banks Yes
DK Danish FSA N/A Uncommon
ES CNMV €300,000 and own funds Issuers of structured notes
requirement, which varies
depending on assets under
management
FI Finnish FSA €169,000 Yes Yes Direct sales via Yes
management company
FR COB 25 of operating expenses Yes Wrappers Yes
with a minimum of
€50,000
IE IFSRA Usually €50,000 Yes Yes Private banks, brokers Yes
initial capital + 3 months
of annualised expenditure
IT Bank of Italy; €1,000,000 Yes Yes Private placements Yes
CONSOB
LU CSSF €125,000 Yes Yes Private banks, Yes
(type 2 managers), universal banks
€1,500,000
(type 3 managers)
NL Netherlands AFM €226,890 Yes Yes Direct sales, brokers, Yes
issuers of structured notes
PT CMVM €250,000 Uncommon
SE Swedish FSA SEK 1,000,000 Yes Yes Direct sales on private basis
UK UK’s FSA Usually €50,000 Independent financial
own funds + liquid capital advisors, wrappers
of three months’ annualised
expenditure
Table 16 The regulation of hedge funds, their managers and their distribution in a selected
number of EU Member States
(situation as of May 2003)
Source: PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2004b), Tables 2, 3 and 4.
From its earlier mentioned consultation, the
United Kingdom’s FSA concluded that there
was no great desire on the part of the industry to
produce and sell retail hedge fund products.
However, more recently the FSA has indicated
that it might re-examine the prohibition to sell
77 See also International Organization of Securities
Commissions (2003).55
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8 CONCLUSIONS
hedge funds to retail investors.78 Germany, by
contrast, adopted at the end of 2003 a new
investment act that implemented a new legal
framework for domestic hedge funds and the
marketing of foreign funds in Germany.79 The
new act explicitly distinguishes between single
hedge funds and FOHFs. The former are hardly
subject to any investment restrictions at all80,
whereas the latter are subject to more stringent
restrictions, since they are the only hedge funds
that can be distributed by public offer. For
example, the latter are not allowed using
leverage or short-selling, can only invest in
single hedge funds, and are subject to certain
diversification requirements.
8 CONCLUSIONS
The near-default of LTCM proved to be only a
temporary setback to the development of the
global hedge fund industry, which has since
continued to grow strongly. However, the
increasing proliferation of hedge funds as an
alternative investment for both institutional
and retail investors raises questions about the
wider financial stability implications of this
form of financial intermediation.
Although hedge funds are very much
associated with the negative events of the
LTCM period, it is important to understand that
they have various positive effects on the
financial system: they contribute to market
liquidity, play an important role in the price
discovery process, contribute to the
elimination of market inefficiencies, and offer
diversification benefits to investors. Moreover,
their activities have probably contributed to the
integration of financial markets.
The potential threat that hedge funds pose to
the financial system comes via their impact on
credit institutions or financial markets. The
direct exposures of credit institutions to hedge
funds are mainly the result of their role as prime
broker. In this capacity they provide leverage,
issue credit lines and incur trading exposures.
Data seem to indicate that the prime brokerage
business is highly concentrated among a
limited set of important global market players.
This business also seems to have become
increasingly competitive over time, with a
number of second-tier players aggressively
trying to gain market share.
Since the end of the 1990s, considerable
progress has been made by both the public and
the private sector in the further development of
risk management standards that are designed to
address some of the concerns related to
exposures on hedge funds. However, in a
highly competitive field it is also important
that these risk management standards are
effectively applied and not eroded. In this
respect, banking supervisors are expected to
follow up on the earlier recommendations of
the BCBS, possibly also in cooperation with
securities and insurance supervisors.
The indirect links between credit institutions
and hedge funds are more difficult to gauge, but
may be significant. Market data, such as VaR
figures, for example, show that a number of
large credit institutions (including European
ones) have taken on more market risk and are
engaging in hedge fund-like strategies. Under
these conditions, negative market events may
not only have an impact on the direct
relationship between credit institutions and
hedge funds (for example, through credit,
trading,  investment or revenue exposures), but
may also simultaneously affect the proprietary
market positions of credit institutions.
It is very difficult to provide any conclusive
evidence on the impact of hedge funds on
financial markets, which is at least partially
due to the lack of good data. However, the
available information points to a situation
which is probably more positive than before the
78 Sants (2004); see also UK’s Financial Services Authority
(2005a).
79 On the new legal framework in Germany, see for example
Pütz and Schmies (2004).
80 Interestingly, however, the Minister of Finance has the power
to restrict the use of leverage and short sales to prevent abuse
or to protect the integrity of financial markets.56
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81 At the international level, IOSCO is reportedly presently
conducting a stocktaking of regulatory regimes, addressing
the access of retail investors to hedge funds. See UK’s
Financial Services Authority (2005a).
82 Trichet (2005).
LTCM crisis, for three main reasons. First,
banks use more sophisticated techniques to
manage their exposures to hedge funds,
although new challenges are emerging that
need continuous monitoring. Second, as more
players have entered the market, positions are
probably much less concentrated in one or a
few funds. Third, in general it seems that the
leverage levels taken on by funds are now
lower. There is the risk, however, that as more
money flows into hedge funds and the profit
opportunities diminish commensurately, some
players might take on more risk or leverage to
achieve targeted returns. Moreover, there is
some evidence that hedge funds engage in
“crowded trades”, i.e. take similar positions,
which could lead to market disturbance in case
of simultaneous exits in the event of a market
shock.
In addition to the need to monitor whether risk
management practices and techniques are
sufficient for the risks involved, the most
important challenge for public authorities
seems to be to increase their knowledge about
the impact of hedge funds on the financial
system, both through credit institutions and
financial markets. To a large extent, such an
assessment depends on good quality
information – yet high-quality information
tends to be difficult to obtain, as hedge funds
themselves have not increased their disclosure
and transparency to the degree that authorities
had hoped. It is therefore important to continue
to exercise pressure, for example through the
relationship between hedge funds and
regulated firms, to ensure further
improvements in this area. At the same time,
the dialogue of public authorities with the asset
management industry needs to be continued
and enhanced to improve further market
practices by hedge funds.
Whether or not there is a need to regulate hedge
funds from an investor protection point of view
is not clear-cut. On the one hand, there are
indications that hedge funds are becoming
increasingly available to retail investors. On
the other hand, the amount of retail investments
is still very limited compared to the traditional
funds. From a European perspective, it might
therefore be worthwhile first investigating
more closely whether, and in what form,
significant “retailisation” is indeed taking
place in the EU.81At the same time, if there are
indeed important financial stability concerns to
be addressed – primarily via enhanced
transparency and disclosure – this can only be
done effectively in a strongly coordinated
manner at the international (transatlantic)
level.82ANNEXES58
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ANNEX A
EVOLUTION OF THE HEDGE FUND INDUSTRY
Sources: TASS database (30 June 2005 version), TASS Research, Eichengreen et al. (1998), International Monetary Fund (2004),
Financial Stability Forum (2000), Gradante (2003) and Hennessee Group.
Notes: Only funds with reported (estimated) capital under management.
1) September 1999.
2) October 2004.
Table A2 Number of EU hedge funds
Table A1 Number of hedge funds
Source: TASS database (30 June 2005 version).
Note: Only funds with reported (estimated) capital under management.
Strategy, as a % of total 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Directional 60 61 60 61 60 59 58 58
Long/Short Equity Hedge 24 24 24 24 23 25 28 29
Dedicated Short Bias 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
Global Macro 6 8 8 6 6 6 5 5
Emerging Markets 3 4 5 6 7 8 8 9
Managed Futures 23 23 22 23 22 19 16 14
Event Driven 10 10 8 8 8 8 9 9
Market Neutral 6 6 8 8 9 10 10 11
Fixed Income Arbitrage 1 1 2 3 4 3 4 4
Convertible Arbitrage 3 3 4 3 4 4 3 3
Equity Market Neutral 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
Other 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3
Fund of Funds 23 22 23 21 21 21 20 19
Size, as a % of total
≤ $100m 91 89 89 87 88 90 88 85
$100m – $1bn 9 11 10 13 11 10 12 14
> $1bn ... ... 1 1 1 ... ... 1
Total number 294 396 550 799 1,047 1,291 1,516 1,776
Estimates of the whole industry
Van Hedge Fund Advisors 1,977 2,373 2,848 3,417 4,100 4,700 5,100 5,500
TASS Research - - - - - - - -
MAR/Hedge - - - - - - - -
Hennessee Group - 880 1,100 1,640 2,080 2,800 3,000 3,200
Samples of other databases
MAR/Hedge, CISDM 163 233 357 542 887 1,011 1,277 1,428
Strategy, as a % of total 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Directional 34 50 53 59 64 61 60 61
Long/Short Equity Hedge 3 2 8 12 14 14 18 19
Dedicated Short Bias ... ... ... 1 1 ... ... ...
Global Macro 7 15 14 10 9 11 8 8
Emerging Markets 17 17 16 13 11 11 11 13
Managed Futures 7 15 15 24 29 24 22 21
Event Driven 7 4 3 3 2 2 1 1
Market Neutral 3 4 7 6 8 6 5 5
Fixed Income Arbitrage ... 2 4 3 4 3 2 1
Convertible Arbitrage 3 2 1 2 2 1 2 1
Equity Market Neutral ... ... 1 2 2 1 2 3
Other 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 2
Fund of Funds 52 39 36 31 26 31 32 31
Size, as a % of total
≤ $100m 86 76 80 81 86 88 85 84
$100m – $1bn 14 24 20 19 14 12 15 16
> $1bn ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 1
Total number 29 46 74 120 168 218 262 29159
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Table A2 Number of EU hedge funds (cont’d)
Table A1 Number of hedge funds (cont’d)
Strategy, as a % of total 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Directional 57 57 57 53 50 48 47
Long/Short Equity Hedge 31 33 36 36 34 32 31
Dedicated Short Bias 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Global Macro 5 5 4 3 4 4 4
Emerging Markets 8 8 7 5 5 5 5
Managed Futures 12 10 8 8 7 6 7
Event Driven 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Market Neutral 11 12 11 13 15 14 14
Fixed Income Arbitrage 4 3 3 3 4 4 5
Convertible Arbitrage 3 3 4 4 4 4 4
Equity Market Neutral 4 5 5 6 6 6 5
Other 3 3 3 3 4 4 4
Fund of Funds 20 20 20 21 22 25 27
Size, as a % of total
≤ $100m 85 83 81 79 77 72 67
$100m – $1bn 14 16 18 20 22 26 31
> $1bn 1 1 ... 1 1 1 2
Total number 1,969 2,212 2,418 2,697 2,939 3,156 3,264
Estimates of the whole industry
Van Hedge Fund Advisors 5,830 6,200 6,500 7,000 7,500 8,100 -
TASS Research - - - - - 6,700 -
MAR/Hedge 3,000 3,000 - - - - -
Hennessee Group 3,500 4,000 4,800 5,500 5,700 7,000 8,050
Samples of other databases
MAR/Hedge, CISDM 1,385 1,256 1) - - - 1,862 2,000 2)
Strategy, as a % of total 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Directional 59 61 60 55 51 49 48
Long/Short Equity Hedge 20 27 31 32 31 30 29
Dedicated Short Bias ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Global Macro 9 7 6 6 6 6 5
Emerging Markets 12 11 10 7 6 6 5
Managed Futures 18 16 13 10 8 8 9
Event Driven 3 3 4 4 4 4 4
Market Neutral 5 7 7 11 13 13 12
Fixed Income Arbitrage 2 2 2 3 3 3 4
Convertible Arbitrage 1 1 2 2 3 3 2
Equity Market Neutral 2 4 4 6 7 7 6
Other 3 4 3 4 3 3 3
Fund of Funds 30 26 26 25 29 31 33
Size, as a % of total
≤ $100m 81 81 80 77 72 65 59
$100m – $1bn 18 18 19 22 27 34 39
> $1bn 1 1 1 1 1 2 2
Total number 328 397 464 569 669 773 83660
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Sources: TASS database (30 June 2005 version), TASS Research, Eichengreen et al. (1998), International Monetary Fund (2004),
Financial Stability Forum (2000), Gradante (2003) and Hennessee Group.
Notes: Only funds with reported (estimated) capital under management.
1) September 1999.
2) October 2004.
Table A3 Capital under management of hedge funds
(USD billions)
Table A4 Capital under management of EU hedge funds
(USD billions)
Strategy, as a % of total 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Directional 59 61 62 59 60 60 55 52
Long/Short Equity Hedge 24 23 22 27 24 29 29 27
Dedicated Short Bias 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Global Macro 19 25 30 17 18 16 11 10
Emerging Markets 3 4 4 8 11 10 10 11
Managed Futures 11 8 6 6 6 5 4 3
Event Driven 13 12 10 10 10 11 11 12
Market Neutral 6 6 9 11 9 11 14 16
Fixed Income Arbitrage 3 3 3 4 4 5 7 8
Convertible Arbitrage 2 2 5 5 4 4 5 5
Equity Market Neutral 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 3
Other … … … 1 1 2 3 4
Fund of Funds 23 20 18 19 20 17 17 16
Size, as a % of total
≤ $100m 42 36 31 31 31 36 34 29
$100m – $1bn 58 58 46 56 52 49 53 56
> $1bn ... 6 23 13 17 14 13 15
Total capital 11 18 28 43 55 63 83 122
Estimates of the whole industry
Van Hedge Fund Advisors 67 94 120 172 189 217 261 295
TASS Research - - - - - - - -
MAR/Hedge - - - - - - - 145
Hennessee Group - 35 50 99 76 97 130 210
Samples of other databases
MAR/Hedge, CISDM 10 15 23 43 70 71 99 132
Strategy, as a % of total 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Directional 52 45 44 49 51 50 53 56
Long/Short Equity Hedge 4 3 7 13 7 10 15 14
Dedicated Short Bias ... ... ... ... ... ... 1 ...
Global Macro 34 26 21 16 16 11 11 15
Emerging Markets 14 15 13 18 23 23 22 22
Managed Futures 1 1 2 2 4 5 5 5
Event Driven 7 7 7 5 5 3 1 1
Market Neutral 4 14 18 10 9 9 13 9
Fixed Income Arbitrage ... 10 12 6 7 8 8 6
Convertible Arbitrage 4 4 4 4 1 1 1 1
Equity Market Neutral ... ... 1 ... 1 1 4 3
Other ... ... ... ... ... ... 1 2
Fund of Funds 37 34 31 37 35 38 32 32
Size, as a % of total
≤ $100m 38 22 20 19 27 31 29 23
$100m – $1bn 62 78 80 81 73 69 71 64
> $1bn ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 13
Total capital 2 3 4 9 10 11 15 22
Source: TASS database (30 June 2005 version).
Note: Only funds with reported (estimated) capital under management.61
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ANNEX A
Table A4 Capital under management of EU hedge funds (cont’d)
(USD billions)
Table A3 Capital under management of hedge funds (cont’d)
(USD billions)
Strategy, as a % of total 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Directional 48 53 48 44 41 41 40
Long/Short Equity Hedge 31 38 39 35 30 27 27
Dedicated Short Bias 1 1 1 1 … … …
Global Macro 8 6 2 2 3 5 4
Emerging Markets 5 5 4 3 3 5 5
Managed Futures 4 3 3 3 4 4 5
Event Driven 14 13 15 15 13 12 13
Market Neutral 17 13 15 18 19 18 16
Fixed Income Arbitrage 7 5 4 5 6 6 7
Convertible Arbitrage 5 3 4 5 6 6 5
Equity Market Neutral 5 5 6 7 7 5 4
Other 4 4 5 6 6 6 6
Fund of Funds 17 16 17 18 22 23 25
Size, as a % of total
≤ $100m 29 28 26 24 23 19 15
$100m – $1bn 58 61 66 64 63 64 66
> $1bn 12 11 8 12 15 17 20
Total capital 127 157 185 235 270 361 463
Estimates of the whole industry
Van Hedge Fund Advisors 311 480 520 600 650 820 -
TASS Research - - - - - 750 975
MAR/Hedge 175 205 - - - - -
Hennessee Group 221 324 408 564 592 795 1,000+
Samples of other databases
MAR/Hedge, CISDM 128 1211) ---- 3 8 4 2)
Strategy, as a % of total 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Directional 53 58 53 50 52 54 50
Long/Short Equity Hedge 23 34 38 35 36 32 32
Dedicated Short Bias ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Global Macro 11 6 4 4 5 7 4
Emerging Markets 10 11 7 6 6 9 7
Managed Futures 7 6 4 4 5 6 7
Event Driven 1 2 5 4 3 3 4
Market Neutral 13 12 12 14 14 14 13
Fixed Income Arbitrage 8 6 3 3 3 3 6
Convertible Arbitrage 2 1 3 5 5 5 3
Equity Market Neutral 3 5 6 6 6 5 4
Other 3 5 8 9 6 4 4
Fund of Funds 30 23 22 24 26 26 29
Size, as a % of total
≤ $100m 24 23 23 22 20 15 12
$100m – $1bn 68 60 59 63 66 68 69
> $1bn 9 18 18 15 14 17 19
Total capital 24 35 42 55 71 104 13762
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The aim of the reports was to encourage prudent
management of risks generated from banks’ interactions
with highly leveraged institutions.
Measures to reduce risks associated with collateralisation
were suggested.
Review of the near-collapse of LTCM and the analysis of
further sources of remaining systematic vulnerabilities.
Recommendations include increased transparency
through enhanced disclosure of hedge funds.
The report made recommendations on how to improve
counterparty risk management practices and suggested a
possible format for regulatory reporting relating to HLIs.
Focus on risk management issues relating to securities
firms and the need for greater transparency in the hedge
fund sector.
Issues which need further work were identified – for
example, measurement of potential future credit
exposures.
Response to PWG Report, addressing the PWG
recommendation to develop and publish sound practices
for risk management and internal controls.
The report concentrated on systemic risk posed by HLIs
and their impact on market dynamics. Measures
enhancing prudent firm behaviour and market discipline
were brought forward.
Senior managers have reinforced their oversight of HLI
activities, and information flows from HLI have
improved. Competitive pressures should not erode credit
standards.
Strengthened counterparty risk management and
regulatory oversight acknowledged, but counterparty risk
measurement and stress tests need further work.
Disclosure by HLIs has slightly improved, but the
progress remains inconsistent.
The report seeks to improve the state of financial
disclosures and to promote a level playing-field in
disclosure for all financial intermediaries, irrespective
of the type of activities.
The FSA has initiated an evaluation of the current
regulatory framework of hedge fund activities.
The decision was that no amendments to the current UK
regulatory framework of hedge fund activities are
required.
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Sep. 2003 Staff Report to US
Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC)
Aug. 2003 Managed Funds
Association (MFA)
Jan. 2004 European Parliament
June 2005 UK’s FSA
July 2005 Counterparty Risk
Management Policy
Group II (CRMPG)
Aug. 2005 Managed Funds
Association (MFA)
Report
Implications of the Growth
of Hedge Funds
Sound Practices for Hedge
Fund Managers: Update
Resolution on the Future
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Hedge funds: a Discussion




Stability: a Private Sector
Perspective
Sound Practices for Hedge
Fund Managers
Description
Concerns about the rapidity of hedge fund industry
growth and its opaqueness led to the proposal to require
hedge fund managers to register with the SEC under the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and to comply with
certain disclosure requirements.
Update of February 2000 report by five large hedge fund
managers.
The desire to bring offshore hedge funds onshore led to
the proposal to introduce a pan-European, lightly
regulated regime for “sophisticated alternative
investment vehicles”, benefiting from a common EU-
wide passport.
The purpose of DP 3 is to assess whether the present
regulatory regime that applies to retail investment
products is still appropriate in light of existing/new
products (incl. hedge funds). The aim of DP 4 is to
identify potential risks posed by hedge funds and to
stimulate debate.
Review of the June 1999 report.
Update and expansion of August 2003 and February 2000
reports.
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Absolute return – portfolio return without subtracting any benchmark return.
Alpha – return associated with active asset management. Also referred to as non-systematic risk
or specific risk, as opposed to systemic or overall market risk.
Alternative investments – a broad category of investments, other than stocks and bonds,
including venture capital, private equity, real estate, precious metals, collectibles and hedge
funds.
Arbitrage – in theory, a transaction that produces risk-free profit by exploiting mis-priced
securities or any other assets while hedging all risk. In practice, arbitrage strategies do not
eliminate all risk and do entail some risk of loss or uncertainty about total profits.
Beta – broadly denotes volatility and returns associated with general or market-wide risks. A
measure of the volatility relative to the overall market.
Carry trade – involves borrowing funds in a low-yielding currency and investing in a high-
yielding one, or purchasing one security with more yield, or carry, than that which is sold.
Crowded trade – a crowded trade could be defined as multiple parties entering into correlated
trading strategies across one or more markets, where the aggregate volume of trades in the
market(s) is sufficient to constrain the ability of traders to exit from the position on a
simultaneous basis without significantly impacting prevailing prices.
Derivative – a financial instrument whose value depends upon the value of an underlying
security. Options, forwards and futures are examples of derivatives.
Domicile of a fund – the location of the legal entity of the fund.
Fund of hedge funds – a fund that invests in other hedge funds for diversification.
Hedge fund – a fund, whose managers generally have no or very limited restrictions on the use of
various active investment strategies to achieve positive absolute returns, and receive
performance-related fees. Such strategies often involve leverage, derivatives, long and short
positions in securities or any other assets in a wide range of markets.
Herding – A situation in which traders emulate or follow the actions of other traders.
Hurdle rate – the minimum return that must be generated before fund managers may receive any
performance allocation.
Leverage – economic (debt) leverage is associated with increased assets under management,
whereas financial (investment) leverage refers to making investments on margin, where the cost
of investment is less than the exposure it generates (e.g. through the use of financial derivatives).
Lock-up period – the time during which an investor cannot withdraw invested money.70
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Management fee  – an annual fee calculated as a percentage of average capital under
management.
Performance fee – the percentage that the hedge fund manager takes of the return of the fund.
Short-selling – the sale of borrowed assets that a seller does not own.
VaR (Value at Risk) – the estimated maximum potential loss to a portfolio over a given time
period at a given level of confidence. For example, if a ten-day VaR at 99 confidence level is
€100,000, then we can conclude that 99% of the time the portfolio will not decline more than
€100,000 in value within 10 days.
Watermark – a fund valuation below which performance fees are not paid. With a high
watermark, performance (incentive) fees are paid only if cumulative performance recovers any
past shortfalls. For example, a hedge fund manager who loses in the first year and then merely
regains that loss in the second year will not receive an incentive payment for the second year’s
gain.
Wrappers – performance-linked instruments, including unit-linked insurance policies and
structured notes, which mimic the performance of a hedge fund.71
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